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Justice on Our Fields:
Can “Alt-Labor” Organizations Improve
Migrant Farm Workers’ Conditions?
Manoj Dias-Abey*
This article examines how non-traditional labor organizations, also known
as “alt labor,” can improve the working conditions of migrant farm workers in
the United States and Canada. I consider the work of three labor organiza-
tions—the Agricultural Workers Alliance (Canada) (“AWA”), Justice in Motion
(U.S.) (“JIM”), and the Coalition of Immokalee Workers (U.S.) (“CIW”)—by
focusing on the variety of “legal engagements” that these organizations have to
create better working conditions for migrant farm workers. I argue that labor
organizations engage with the law in numerous ways, including: improving the
rights consciousness of workers; supplementing the work of regulators to in-
crease compliance; undertaking private enforcement of their own; instituting
new rights and entitlements through court challenges; building and coalescing
social movements; and designing and implementing private regulatory system. I
find that the AWA and JIM perform important work to build the rights conscious-
ness of workers and improve compliance with existing legal standards in ways
which public regulators are unable to do. However, most workers do not bring
forth claims because they fear employer retaliation. The CIW, on the other hand,
has devised a private regulatory system that overcomes some of the limitations
of public regulatory systems, for example, by allowing farm workers to vindicate
their rights regardless of their migration status. Most importantly, the CIW’s
private regulatory system requires business entities at the top of the supply chain
to take responsibility for working conditions on farms. This system engages with
the political economy of the food system because those businesses at the top of
the supply chain are best positioned to effect working conditions. I conclude by
suggesting that labor organizations actively trying to achieve justice on our
fields, like the AWA, JIM and CIW, may point the way for a rejuvenated labor
movement.
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INTRODUCTION
Recent times have seen the emergence of new types of labor organiza-
tions (“labor organizations” or “organizations”), colloquially known as
“alt-labor,” which seek to improve wages and conditions for working peo-
ple. These organizations have arisen in a context where traditional unions
struggle to contain powerful market forces in North America, forces that
have returned working conditions to a level reminiscent of the early days of
the industrial revolution.1 Representing another face of the labor movement,
these organizations draw on a variety of innovative legal and political strate-
gies to achieve their objectives, acutely demonstrating the human capacity
for resilience, ingenuity, and creativity. They often serve immigrant workers
in low-wage industries that unions have struggled to represent. A growing
number of scholars from a variety of disciplines have attempted to critically
analyze their potential.2
1 See, e.g., Arne L. Kalleberg, Precarious Work, Insecure Workers: Employment Relations
in Transition, 74 AM. SOCIOL. REV. 1, 5 (2009) (arguing that most work in the United States
was precarious before the 1930s, and the stable, secure employment that characterized indus-
trial employment in the three decades following WWII was an exception to this. According to
Kalleberg, however, the dynamics of precarious employment today are notably different).
2 See, e.g., NEW LABOR IN NEW YORK (Ruth Milkman & Ed Ott eds., 2014); JANICE FINE,
WORKER CENTERS (2006); RUTH MILKMAN, L.A. STORY (2006); Seth D. Harris, Don’t
Mourn—Reorganize! An Introduction to the Next Wave Organizing Symposium Issue, 50
N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 303 (2005/06); EMERGING LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS FOR THE
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This article contributes to this growing literature by studying the work
of labor organizations aiming to improve the conditions of migrant workers
in the fruit and vegetable sector in the United States and Canada. Fruit and
vegetable production, an extremely labor-intensive process, is responsible
for engaging the vast majority of waged farm workers in the agricultural
sector.3 One of the most notable features of fruit and vegetable production in
North America is that the workforce is primarily comprised of migrants.4
Waged farm workers mostly fall into one of three categories: recent immi-
grants, temporary or seasonal workers entering under temporary migrant
worker programs, or undocumented migrants.
Dismal working conditions have been a continuous feature of the agri-
cultural sector. For example, the intrepid muckraking journalist, Carey Mc-
Williams, surveyed the state of farm workers’ conditions in California in
1939 and found that the “housing situation was indescribably wretched,”
“health and sanitary conditions were. . .equally appalling,” and farm work-
ers were struggling to support their families on “incredibly low wages.”5
This picture has changed little in the intervening period.6 Farm workers earn
sub-poverty wages,7 work seasonally only when there is work, are subject to
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Richard B. Freeman et al. eds., 2004); JENNIFER GORDON, SUBUR-
BAN SWEATSHOPS (2005); Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant Work-
ers, The Workplace Project, and the Struggle for Social Change, 95 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
407 (1995).
3 See PHILIP L. MARTIN, PROMISE UNFULFILLED 9-10 (2003).
4 While it may be problematic to use the catch-all term “migrant” to refer to a group of
workers with vast cultural, ethnic and linguistic differences, my use is simply intended to
analytically group a range of workers incorporated into North American agriculture in a simi-
lar way.
5 CAREY MCWILLIAMS, FACTORIES IN THE FIELD 316–22 (1939).
6 See, e.g., SETH HOLMES, FRESH FRUIT, BROKEN BODIES (2013) (providing a richly tex-
tured account of the lived experiences of migrant farm workers in the United States); SOUTH-
ERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, CLOSE TO SLAVERY (2013), https://www.splcenter.org/sites/
default/files/d6_legacy_files/downloads/publication/SPLC-Close-to-Slavery-2013.pdf [https://
perma.cc/LT3P-45FY] (providing a portrait of current farm working conditions in the United
States); FARMWORKER JUSTICE, NO WAY TO TREAT A GUEST (2011), https://www.farmwork
erjustice.org/sites/default/files/documents/7.2.a.6%20fwj.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8NL-4EY5]
(same); OXFAM, LIKE MACHINES IN THE FIELD (2004), https://www.oxfamamerica.org/static/oa
3/files/like-machines-in-the-fields.pdf [https://perma.cc/3MDP-RMPN] (same); UNITED FOOD
AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS CANADA, THE STATUS OF MIGRANT FARM WORKERS IN CANADA
(2010–2011), http://www.ufcw.ca/templates/ufcwcanada/images/awa/publications/UFCW-Stat
us_of_MF_Workers_2010-2011_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/X4PP-RYJ9] [hereinafter UFCW,
2011 REPORT] (providing an overview of the situation in Canada); UNITED FOOD AND COM-
MERCIAL WORKERS CANADA & CANADIAN LABOUR CONGRESS, NATIONAL REPORT: STATUS OF
MIGRANT FARM WORKERS IN CANADA (2002) [hereinafter UFCW & CLC, NATIONAL RE-
PORT] (same).
7 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL WORKERS SURVEY
(NAWS) iii (2013–2014), https://www.doleta.gov/agworker/pdf/NAWS_Research_Report_12
_Final_508_Compliant.pdf [https://perma.cc/GQ5X-XS4Z] (noting that U.S. farm workers
earned a mean and median income of between $15,000 to $17,499 from agricultural employ-
ment in the previous year); STATISTICS CANADA, EMPLOYMENT INCOME STATISTICS IN 2010,
2011 NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY: DATA TABLES, http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/nhs-enm/
2011/dp-pd/dt-td/Rp-eng.cfm?LANG=&APATH=3&DETAIL=0&DIM=0&FL=A&FREE
=0&GC=0&GID=0&GK=0&GRP=0&PID=106738&PRID=0&PTYPE=105277&S=0&
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discrimination and harassment by labor contractors and supervisors,8 and are
exposed to dangerous occupational hazards.9 Often, repaying debts incurred
as a result of illegally charged “recruitment fees” further reduces the take
home pay of migrant workers.10 The working conditions of farm workers
presents in stark form the situation facing many precarious workers in North
America today.
A number of factors are responsible for this situation. I suggest that
powerful economic transformations, such as increased international competi-
tion, growing operating costs and more demanding buyers, are affecting ag-
ricultural employers and applying downward pressure on the working
conditions of farm workers.11 Equally important, farm workers are excluded
from many of the legal protections available to other workers.12 In the
United States, for example, farmworkers are excluded from the application
of the federal National Labor Relations Act13 (“NLRA”) and vast swathes of
the Fair Labor Standards Act14 (“FLSA”). In Ontario, one of Canada’s most
fecund provinces for fruits and vegetable production, farm workers are ex-
cluded from the general labor relations statute and several important em-
SHOWALL=0&SUB=0&Temporal=2013&THEME=98&VID=0&VNAMEE=&
VNAMEF= [https://perma.cc/UW9U-9QNB] (reporting that Canadian agriculture and horti-
culture workers earned a median wage and salary of CDN$11,608).
8 See, e.g., THE FARMWORKER SEXUAL VIOLENCE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT, SEX-
UAL VIOLENCE AGAINST FARMWORKERS 10 (2010), https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/
files/ovw_legalproviders.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8G5-WNKE]; Richard Kamm, Extending the
Progress of the Feminist Movement to Encompass the Rights of Migrant Farmworker, 75 CHI.-
KENT. L. REV. 765, 769 (2000); Maria M. Dominguez, Sex Discrimination and Sexual Harass-
ment in Agricultural Labor, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & SOC. POL’Y & L. 231, 240–42 (1997).
9 See, e.g., BON APPE´TIT MANAGEMENT COMPANY FOUNDATION & UNITED FARM WORK-
ERS, INVENTORY OF FARMWORKER ISSUES AND PROTECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (2011),
https://www.oxfamamerica.org/static/oa3/files/inventory-of-farmworker-issues-and-protec
tions-in-the-usa.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZB8-L7CS] (setting out the occupational health and
safety issues of farm workers in the United States); U.S. DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE, PROFILE OF
HIRED FARMWORKERS (2008), http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article
=1564&context=key_workplace [https://perma.cc/Y3MN-FSUU] (same); Arthur L. Frank et
al., Issues of Agricultural Safety and Health, 25 ANNU. REV. PUBL. HEALTH 225 (2004)
(same); Janet McLaughlin et al., Paper vs. Practice: Occupational Health and Safety Protec-
tions and Realities for Temporary Foreign Agricultural Workers in Ontario, 16-2 PERSPEC-
TIVES INTERDISCIPLINAIRES SUR LE TRAVAIL ET LA SANTE´ (2014) (providing an overview of the
occupational health and safety issues facing farm workers in Canada); Michael Pysklywec et
al., Doctors within Borders: Meeting the Health Needs of Migrant Farm Workers in Canada,
183 CAN. MED. ASSOC. J., no. 9, 1039 (2011) (same); Kerry Preibisch & Jenna Hennebry,
Temporary Migration, Chronic Effects: The Health of International Migrant Workers in Ca-
nada, 183 CAN. MED. ASSOC. J., 1033 (2011) (same).
10 See, e.g., Jennifer Gordon, Regulating the Human Supply Chain, 102 IOWA L. REV. 445,
448–49 (2017); FAY FARADAY, PROFITING FROM THE PRECARIOUS: HOW RECRUITMENT PRAC-
TICES EXPLOIT MIGRANT WORKERS 32–36 (2014), http://metcalffoundation.com/wp-content/
uploads/2014/04/Profiting-from-the-Precarious.pdf [https://perma.cc/2MB9-DUTE]; VERITE´,
IMMIGRANT WORKERS IN US AGRICULTURE: THE ROLE OF LABOR BROKERS IN VULNERABILITY
TO FORCED LABOR 6 (2010), http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article
=2174&context=globaldocs [https://perma.cc/X65F-7H4Z].
11 See infra discussion Part II.
12 This varies from state to state in the United States, and province to province in Canada.
13 29 U.S.C. § 152(3).
14 29 U.S.C. § 203(5)(f).
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ployment standards. These exclusions were justified on the grounds that
farming was primarily a family affair and the small number of waged labor-
ers in the industry lived and worked alongside the owners.15 Despite this no
longer being the case in the modern era of industrial agriculture, farmers and
their powerful lobbies have continued to deploy these arguments to great
effect to maintain the farming sector’s exceptionalism.16
In addition, farm workers have difficulty realizing the few labor rights
they have as a consequence of the weak enforcement of labor standards by
government agencies. Most scholars agree that “proactive enforcement,”
through unannounced audits and inspections, is the most effective way to
detect violations and provide redress for vulnerable workers.17 However,
proactive enforcement of labor rights by public agencies tends to be weak,
due to resource constraints, over-large mandates, and conflicting political
priorities.18 This is especially the situation in the agricultural sector, where
the scale of the problem seems to defeat bureaucratic resolve.
Collective action by farm workers has intermittently improved their
plight. In the United States for example, farm worker mobilizations during
the 1960s and 1970s, led by the United Farm Workers (“UFW”), managed
to win a number of concessions. In this period, the minimum wage under the
FLSA was extended to farm employers that employed more than 10 full-
time workers, although farm employers continued to be exempt from over-
time provisions and were permitted to use child labor.19 While farm workers
continued to be excluded from the NLRA, in 1975, farmworker advocacy
resulted in the passage of the Agricultural Labor Relations Act20 (“ALRA”)
in California, which established collective bargaining rights for agricultural
workers in that state based on the prevalent “Wagner Act-model” (which
includes enterprise-level bargaining and the exclusive right of unions to ne-
15 MARTIN, supra note 3. R
16 See generally KATHRYN S. OLMSTED, RIGHT OUT OF CALIFORNIA (2015); Eric Tucker,
Will the Vicious Circle of Precariousness Be Unbroken? The Exclusion of Ontario Farm Work-
ers from the Occupational Health and Safety Act, in PRECARIOUS EMPLOYMENT 256, 262
(Leah F. Vosko ed., 2006).
17 DAVID WEIL, IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS THROUGH STRATEGIC ENFORCE-
MENT: A REPORT TO THE WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION (2010), https://www.dol.gov/whd/re
sources/strategicEnforcement.pdf [https://perma.cc/HW89-FXME]; LEAH F. VOSKO ET AL.,
NEW APPROACHES TO ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE WITH LABOUR REGULATORY STAN-
DARDS: THE CASE OF ONTARIO, CANADA 100 (2011), http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1069&context=clpe [https://perma.cc/K2SU-KLFG].
18 David Weil, Enforcing Labour Standards in Fissured Workplaces: The US Experience,
22 ECON. LAB. RELAT. REV. 33, 34 (2011); VOSKO ET AL., supra note 17, at 26. R
19 Amy K. Leibman et al., Occupational Health Policy and Immigrant Workers in the
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing Sector, 56 AM. J. IND. MED. 975, 976 (2013); Zama Cour-
sen-Neff, FIELDS OF PERIL: CHILD LABOR IN US AGRICULTURE (2010), https://www.hrw.org/
report/2010/05/05/fields-peril/child-labor-us-agriculture [https://perma.cc/CTX9-BPUE] (esti-
mating that several hundreds of thousands of children work in U.S. agriculture as a result of
the FLSA because the FLSA does not contain the same prohibitions on child labor that apply
to non-agricultural industries—e.g., children can work on the family farm at any age, and can
work as hired farm workers after the age of 12).
20 Cal. Labor Code § 1166.3.
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gotiate on behalf of employees once majority support is established).21 Sub-
sequently, the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act of
198322 was passed federally, amending the much weaker Farm Labor Con-
tractor Registration Act.23 Collective bargaining under the ALRA led to
some notable successes in the 1970s. However, these gains were soon nulli-
fied by concerted employer action, which included farmers vigorously con-
testing union elections, committing unfair labor practices, engaging in
surface bargaining, and utilizing strike-breakers.24 Traditional unions today
continue to attempt to organize farm workers under collective bargaining
regimes where they can. This is despite the well-known challenge of or-
ganizing farm workers on an enterprise-by-enterprise basis, which the pre-
vailing model demands.25
Alt-labor organizations, however, employ a range of different strate-
gies. In this article, I consider case studies of three labor organizations work-
ing to improve farm workers’ conditions in order to draw lessons that can be
applied more broadly. I focus on the work of organizations rather than grass-
roots movements because an organizational form is important for actors to
agglomerate political, economic and cultural resources and fuse these with
the creativity and motivation necessary to bring about change.26 The organi-
zational form also allows labor organizations to experiment with legal and
political engagements over a matter of several years, learning from mistakes
and winnowing down those strategies that yield results. This is not to sug-
gest that grassroots movements are not also significant players in improving
the lives of migrant farm workers. In fact, labor organizations are often
21 Herman M. Levy, The Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975—La Esperanza De
California Para El Futuro, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 783, 785 (1975); MARTIN, supra note 3, R
at 72.
22 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1872.
23 Pub. L. No. 88-582, 78 Stat. 920 (1964).
24 MARTIN, supra note 3, at Pt. II. R
25 See, e.g., LEAH F. VOSKO, Tenuously Unionised: Temporary Migrant Workers and the
Limits of Formal Mechanisms Designed to Promote Collective Bargaining in British Colum-
bia, 43 IND. L. J. 451, 459 (2014); Eric Tucker, Farm Worker Exceptionalism: Past, Present,
and the post-Fraser Future, in CONSTITUTIONAL LABOUR RIGHTS IN CANADA 30 (Fay Faraday
et al. eds., 2012) (noting that are many challenges to organizing farm workers under the Wag-
ner Act-model, which include: getting access to workers who may live on employer-owned
residences, overcoming workers’ distrust of unions, building solidarity among a workforce that
is linguistically and culturally diverse, and having to contend with various forms of employer
resistance to unionization); Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L. J. 1, 67 (2016)
(arguing that alternative model of sectoral bargaining might hold more promise for agricultural
workers).
26 See, e.g., Marshall Ganz, Resources and Resourcefulness: Strategic Capacity in the
Unionization of California Agriculture, 1959–1966, 105 AM. J. OF SOCIOL. 1003, 1041 (2000).
See generally DOUG MCADAM, POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF BLACK INSUR-
GENCY, 1930–1970 (2d ed. 1999); ALDON D. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT (1986).
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deeply embedded in social movements, and thus, can be considered a form
of “social movement organization.”27
The three labor organizations analyzed in this article have been selected
for their prototypical value.28 Each performs different functions: the Agricul-
tural Workers Alliance (“AWA”) support centers operate a network of
worker centers that help workers claim their legal rights; Justice in Motion29
(“JIM”) facilitates cross-border litigation; and the Coalition of Immokalee
Workers (“CIW”) monitors and enforces a private system of regulation that
it devised. To study the work of these organizations I used a variety of
means. First, I reviewed archival material, which included relevant docu-
mentary and online sources—reports, annual reviews, websites and the like.
I also reviewed secondary sources—such as journal articles, book chapters,
and theses—that provide additional details about the organizations. Finally, I
conducted interviews with key participants in each of the organizations, ei-
ther by phone or in person.30 There are of course many more labor organiza-
tions active in the field, and I would suggest that close examination of their
strategies is warranted. In the meantime, deep contextual analysis of even
three organizations reveals some significant insights.
I argue that labor organizations perform a number of important func-
tions. To properly evaluate the impact of these strategies it is necessary to
examine a range of contextual factors. It is for this reason that I consider the
work of the AWA, JIM, and CIW against the background of the political
economy of the food system. The relevant political economy includes how
production and consumption is organized in the food system, particular fea-
tures of the regulatory systems that govern farm workers’ working condi-
tions, and the migrant status of the workers who lead lives materially and
imaginatively affected by borders.
I find that the AWA and JIM perform important work to build the rights
consciousness of workers and improve compliance with existing legal stan-
dards in ways that public regulators are unable. However, most workers do
not bring forth claims because they fear employer retaliation. The CIW, on
the other hand, has devised a private regulatory system that overcomes some
of the limitations of public regulatory systems, for example, by allowing
farm workers to vindicate their rights regardless of their migration status.
27 See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman et al., On Law, Organizations, and Social Movements, 6
ANNU. REV. LAW SOC’Y SCI. 653, 659-61 (2010); Mayer N. Zald & Roberta Ash, Social Move-
ment Organizations: Growth, Decay and Change, 44 SOC. FORCES 327 (1966).
28 See, e.g., Bent Flyvbjerg, Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research, 12
QUAL. INQ. 219, 232 (2006); John Gerring, What is the Case Study and What is it Good For?,
98 AM. POLIT. SCI. REV. 341, 348 (2004).
29 Justice in Motion was formerly known as the Global Justice Workers Alliance.
30 The following people were interviewed, often on multiple occasions: Stan Raper (Coor-
dinator, Agricultural Workers Alliance), Cathleen Caron (Executive Director, Justice in Mo-
tion), Nan Schivone (Legal Director, Justice in Motion), and Marley Moynahan
(Communications Officer, Coalition of Immokalee Workers). Stan Raper, a mainstay of farm
worker advocacy in Canada, tragically passed away in June 2017.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\53-1\HLC102.txt unknown Seq: 8 27-MAR-18 16:21
174 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 53
Most importantly, the CIW’s private regulatory system requires business en-
tities at the top of the supply chain to take responsibility for working condi-
tions on farms. This system engages with the political economy of the food
system because those businesses at the top of the supply chain are best posi-
tioned to effect working conditions.
This article consists of three parts. In Part I, I provide a typology of the
various strategies, or “legal engagements,” that labor organizations utilize. I
introduce the term legal engagements to capture the various ways in which
both public and private norms can be mobilized.31 In Part II of this article, I
consider in detail the legal engagements of the AWA, JIM and CIW and
evaluate their effectiveness. In the final part, Part III, I discuss the circum-
stances under which labor organizations can improve farm workers’
conditions.
I. MAKING SENSE OF THE WORK OF LABOR ORGANIZATIONS: A TYPOLOGY
OF LEGAL ENGAGEMENTS
The work of the UFW in the 1960s and 1970s, possibly the most well-
known and successful example of organized resistance by farm workers in
North America in recent history, provides a useful starting point to consider
the relationship between law, organizations, and social transformation.
When the UFW started organizing farm workers in California in the early
1960s, it faced several seemingly insurmountable obstacles: hostile growers,
indifferent federal and state governments, labor law regimes that specifically
excluded farm workers, and a labor migration program—the “Bracero” pro-
gram—that gave employers ready access to a vast pool of unorganized
workers from Mexico.32 Within the span of two decades, the UFW, with
Cesar Chavez and Dolores Huerta at its helm, managed to transform work-
ing conditions in the agricultural sector in California. It organized farm
workers to secure agreements with hundreds of farm employers, forged im-
portant links with sympathetic allies, brought pressure to bear on the federal
government to end temporary labor programs that were intended as replace-
ments for the Bracero Program, and at its zenith, secured the passage of
labor relations legislation in California that gave farm workers the option of
bargaining collectively with their employers for better working conditions.33
31 See generally Sally Engle Merry et al., Law from Below: Women’s Human Rights and
Social Movements in New York City, 44 LAW SOC’Y REV. 101, 108 (2010); Michael McCann,
Law and Social Movements: Contemporary Perspectives, 2 ANNU. REV. LAW SOC. SCI. 17, 18
(2006); STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS (2nd ed., 2004); DAVID M. ENGEL &
FRANK W. MUNGER, RIGHTS INCLUSION (2003); MICHAEL W. MCCANN, TAKING REFORM SERI-
OUSLY (1986) (these sources cover the instrumental and cultural ways in which rights can used
to effect social change). Since the extensive literature on “rights mobilization” does not ex-
pressly consider the role of private regulation, I introduce the term legal engagements to en-
compass the ways in which both public and private norms can be utilized.
32 See, e.g., KITTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE 122, 156 (1992).
33 See, e.g., GILBERT FELIPE MIRELES, CONTINUING LA CAUSA (2013); MARSHALL GANZ,
WHY DAVID SOMETIMES WINS 7 (2009); Jennifer Gordon, Law, Lawyers, and Labor: The
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Although the UFW’s successes in developing collective agreements to
regulate labor conditions eventually proved to be fleeting, they do provide a
valuable lesson for us today about the need to have a strategic orientation
towards state law. The UFW started organizing workers in 1962, but it did
not manage to win the passage of collective bargaining legislation until
1975.34 In the intervening period, the UFW managed to win 150 contracts
with growers covering some 50,000 workers, often creatively using the law
in a way that asked not only “what are our rights here?” but also “how can
we best turn this legal situation to the union’s organizing advantage?”35 Le-
gal engagement for the UFW during this period did not include relying upon
the suite of labor and employment rights that we usually associate with
worker advocacy. Instead, the UFW understood that law could build a sense
that farm workers shared a common struggle and joint fate. In this way, by
creatively and strategically engaging with legal categories and norms, the
UFW used legal rights to build a movement. For example, the UFW brought
a variety of legal claims and defended a range of suits initiated by farmers,
and during these proceedings treated the court as a theater of resistance,
often filling the courts with farm workers and their supporters.36
In this section, I unpack the variety of legal engagements that labor
organizations have with law to create better working conditions for migrant
farm workers. I introduce the term “legal engagements” to refer to both
fairly conventional ways of using law (for example, seeking to improve
compliance with existing laws and pursuing the expansion of the suite of
rights that migrant farm workers can access) and less conventional ap-
proaches, such as treating law as a cultural and political resource and build-
ing private regulatory systems that mimic state regimes.  In the tradition of
socio-legal scholars, I consider these various actions to be interconnected
because law and politics are closely intertwined.37
A. Building rights consciousness
One way in which labor organizations can empower workers is by in-
forming them of their legal rights. Employment and health and safety stan-
dards in the United States and Canada are enforced primarily through worker
United Farm Workers’ Legal Strategy in the 1960s and 1970s and the Role of Law in Union
Organizing Today, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 8 (2005); Miriam J. Wells & Don Villarejo,
State Structures and Social Movement Strategies: The Shaping of Farm Labor Protections in
California, 32 POL. & SOC’Y 291, 296 (2004); MARTIN, supra note 3. R
34 Agricultural Labor Relations Act, Cal. Labor Code § 1140 (1975).
35 Gordon, supra note 33, at 17. R
36 See id.
37 See generally Catherine Albiston, The Dark Side of Litigation as a Social Movement
Strategy, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 61 (2011); Harry W. Arthurs & Brent Arnold, Does the
Charter Matter?, 11 REV. CONST. STUD. 37 (2005); SCHEINGOLD, supra note 31; W. A. BO- R
GART, COURTS AND COUNTRY (1994); MCCANN, TAKING REFORM SERIOUSLY, supra note 31; R
JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM (1978).
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complaints.38 In order for workers to be able to make a complaint to the
relevant government authority, they must possess knowledge about their le-
gal rights and entitlements. Although migrant farm workers are more than
capable of recognizing exploitative working conditions, they may not have
the necessary knowledge to recognize when their treatment constitutes a
breach of a specific law, take the appropriate steps to lodge a complaint, and
advocate for their entitlements through the relevant bureaucratic process.
Some socio-legal scholars caution that knowledge about the law does
not necessarily translate into action.39 As a result, these scholars developed
the notion of legal consciousness to explain how people understand and ex-
perience law. As Laura Beth Nielson explains, “legal consciousness not only
explores how people think about the law (consciousness about law) but also
the ways in which largely unconscious ideas about the law can affect deci-
sions they make.”40 This means that broader notions about the law may
shape workers action (or inaction), and that knowledge does not always re-
sult in self-advocacy.
In the case of migrant farm workers, their interactions with the law in
their home countries (e.g. negative experiences with state officials) may af-
fect their readiness to make use of formal law to resolve workplace issues.41
Furthermore, for undocumented migrants, fear of revealing their lack of au-
thorization, a greater willingness to endure immediate pain for the attain-
ment of long-term goals, and feelings of a lack of legitimacy, may inhibit
claim-making.42
Of course, lack of self-advocacy through the legal-bureaucratic chan-
nels does not mean that workers do not resolve disputes with their employers
through alternative avenues,43 or register their resistance to exploitative
working conditions in a myriad of other ways, such as walking off premises
to protest health and safety concerns.44 Labor organizations should adopt a
38 See, e.g., VOSKO ET AL., supra note 17, at 5 (Canada); David Weil & Amanda Pyles, R
Why Complain? Complaints, Compliance, and the Problem of Enforcement in the U.S. Work-
place, 27 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 59, 59 (2005) (United States).
39 See, e.g., Adrian A. Smith, Legal Consciousness and Resistance in Caribbean Seasonal
Agricultural Workers, 20 CAN. J. L. & SOC’Y 95, 105 (2005) [hereinafter Smith, Legal Con-
sciousness]; Laura Beth Nielsen, Situating Legal Consciousness: Experience and Attitudes of
Ordinary Citizens about Law and Street Harassment, 34 LAW SOC’Y REV. 1055, 1059 (2000);
PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW (1998); Austin Sarat,
“. . .The Law is All Over”: Power, Resistance and the Legal Consciousness of the Welfare
Poor, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 343, 344–47 (1990); SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE
AND GETTING EVEN (1990).
40 Nielsen, supra note 39, at 1058. R
41 See, e.g., Smith, Legal Consciousness, supra note 39, at 103–05. R
42 See Shannon M. Gleeson, Labor Rights for All? The Role of Undocumented Immigrant
Status for Worker Claim Making, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 561, 561 (2010).
43 See Catherine Albiston et al., The Dispute Tree and the Legal Forest, 10 ANNU. REV.
LAW & SOC. SCI. 105, 105 (2014).
44 See Adrian A. Smith, Racialized Justice: The Legal and Extra-Legal Struggles of Mi-
grant Agricultural Workers in Canada, 31 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 15, 26 (2013) [herein-
after Smith, Racialized Justice]; Smith, Legal Consciousness, supra note 39, at 105. R
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more nuanced understanding of rights consciousness when thinking about
how they can help farm workers identify the ways in which their working
conditions are exploitative, name the responsible party, and seek redress.
B. Improving compliance with statutory standards
Labor organizations can also work to improve compliance with existing
legal standards. As Harry Arthurs notes, “[l]abour standards ultimately suc-
ceed or fail on the issue of compliance,” 45 and unfortunately, compliance
tends to be particularly poor in the agricultural sector.46 We know that em-
ployers routinely ignore minimum employment standards that are designed
to provide a basic floor of working conditions.47 In this context, the enforce-
ment strategies adopted by regulators, which are charged with ensuring com-
pliance with these laws, can play a major role in changing employer
behavior to promote compliance.48 Labor organizations can assist public reg-
ulators with their enforcement work, and take direct steps of their own.
How can labor organizations serve a useful role supplementing the en-
forcement work of regulatory agencies? Generally speaking, most labor in-
spectors use a combination of “reactive” and “proactive” methods to
identify violations: reactive methods involve waiting for workers to come
forward with complaints, and proactive methods involve agencies identify-
ing non-compliant employers through audits and inspections.49 Workers may
have difficulty making complaints because they lack knowledge about their
rights and do not know how to navigate the complaints process.50 They may
also fear the risk of reprisal by their employer.51 Given this context, labor
organizations can play a role in helping workers prepare their claims and
guide them through the complaints-resolution process.52 It is also possible to
imagine labor organizations assisting directly with agencies’ proactive en-
forcement efforts, for example, by monitoring for breaches of labor stan-
dards and providing information and technical expertise.53 Because
regulatory agencies cannot be present everywhere, labor organizations may
have a comparative advantage with providing up-to-date information, which
45 HARRY W. ARTHURS, FAIRNESS AT WORK 53 (2006).
46 See, e.g., OXFAM, supra note 6, at 40. R
47 See id.
48 See WEIL, supra note 17. R
49 VOSKO ET AL., supra note 17, at 4–6. R
50 See Weil & Pyles, supra note 38, at 63–64. R
51 See id.
52 See, e.g., Matthew Amengual & Janice Fine, Co-enforcing Labor Standards: The
Unique Contribution of State and Worker Organizations in Argentina and the United States,
11 REG. & GOVERNANCE 129, 135 (2017); SHANNON GLEESON, CONFLICTING COMMITMENTS
27–28 (2012); Jennifer Gordon, The Lawyer is Not the Protagonist: Community Campaigns,
Law, and Social Change, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 2133, 2136 (2007); FINE, supra note 2. R
53 See, e.g., id.
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can help agencies determine their proactive inspection strategies.54 That is,
labor organizations can act as “knowledge providers, watchdogs, [and]
auditors.”55
Labor organizations can also undertake enforcement work of their own.
They could provide information to farm employers who may not understand
their legal obligations. What constitutes legal compliance is often ambiguous
and dynamic, and labor organizations can shape more broadly what it means
to be in compliance with legal rules.56 Where employment standards legisla-
tion allows workers to sue employers directly, labor organizations can un-
dertake this work.  For example, in California, the Private Attorneys General
Act57 allows private citizens to sue for certain “serious violations” of the
California Labor Code, which previously could only be initiated by the state
regulator, the Labor and Workforce Development Agency. Subsequent judi-
cial decisions have also allowed these private suits to proceed as class ac-
tions.58 Similarly, private actions are permitted under the federal FLSA. This
provides labor organizations with another powerful avenue to promote
compliance.
C. Using litigation to win new rights for migrant farm workers
Progressive movements have often looked to the courts as a source of
social reform, particularly in circumstances where the political process has
been unreceptive to their demands.59 Labor organizations may be able to
engage with the courts in a similar manner to win new rights for migrant
farm workers, for example, by invoking constitutional rights and
principles.60
54 See, e.g., Janice Fine, Solving the Problem from Hell: Tripartism as a Strategy for Ad-
dressing Labour Standards Non-Compliance in the United States, 50 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 813,
825–26 (2013); Janice Fine & Jennifer Gordon, Strengthening Labor Standards Enforcement
Through Partnership with Workers’ Organizations, 28 POLITICS & SOC’Y 552, 553 (2010);
JOHN BRAITHWAITE, REGULATORY CAPITALISM 64–86 (2008); BRIDGET M. HUTTER & JOAN
O’MAHONY, THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS IN REGULATING BUSINESS 5–6
(2004), http://www.lse.ac.uk/accounting/carr/pdf/dps/disspaper26.pdf [https://perma.cc/D333-
24ZS].
55 HUTTER & O’MAHONY, supra note 54, at 10. R
56 See LAUREN B. EDELMAN, WORKING LAW (2016).
57 Cal. Labor Code § 2698 et seq. (2004).
58 See, e.g., Blake R. Bertagna, PAGA: One Decade Later, 39 EMP. REL. L. J. 44, 47
(2013).
59 See, e.g., MCCANN, TAKING REFORM SERIOUSLY, supra note 31. R
60 For example, in Dunmore v. Ontario (AG), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016 (Can.), the United
Food and Commercial Workers Canada and the Agricultural Workers Alliance challenged the
exclusion of farm workers from the collective bargaining regime in Ontario, arguing that it
violated section 2(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitu-
tion Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.) [hereinafter Canadian
Charter]. Similarly, in Griego v. New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Administration, No.
CV-2009-10130 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Bernalillo Cnty. Dec. 27, 2011), the New Mexico Center on
Law and Poverty together with the National Center for Law and Economic Justice and the
Sargent Shriver National Center on Poverty Law, brought a successful suit, which argued that
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The socio-legal literature highlights a number of criticisms about the
use of litigation as a tool for progressive change. Some question whether
constitution-based litigation actually improves the lives of those on whose
behalf these suits are brought.61 There are several reasons for why court ac-
tion might not provide results. Courts may be ill-equipped to receive and
resolve issues involving collective interests because they are structured to
privilege individual freedom and private ownership of property.62 Further-
more, courts can only make declarations about rights, they cannot imple-
ment them. In Gerald Rosenberg’s words, “court decisions, requiring people
to act, are not self-executing.”63 Finally, critics question whether court-cen-
tric tactics monopolize resources, dominate a movement’s priorities, and
simply legitimate existing power arrangements.64
While perceptive, many of these criticisms depend on context. The Ca-
nadian Supreme Court, for example, recently found that the right to strike—
one of the most quintessentially collective activities—was constitutionally
protected.65 Labor organizations may also be able to overcome some of the
challenges through careful consideration and planning. For example, Rosen-
berg’s objection can be overcome if court-centered strategies are accompa-
nied by movements on the ground that continue to apply pressure on
recalcitrant administrators to actualize the rights that have been won through
litigation.
D. Drawing on law as a strategic resource to achieve
secondary objectives
Advocates can also use legal mobilization to achieve aims other than
simply winning in court. The law can serve as a cultural and political re-
source regardless of whether the litigation succeeds.66 For the sake of analyt-
ical clarity, many of these secondary effects can be categorized as either
internal or external to the movement.67 Internal effects include those factors
that relate to the movement itself, such as participants’ sense of identity and
cohesion, and external effects encompass matters relevant to the targets of
the movement.
the exclusion of farm and ranch laborers from the state’s Workers’ Compensation Act, N.M.
Stat. § 52-1-1 et seq. (1996), breached the state constitution’s equal protection clause.
61 See, e.g., Judy Fudge & Harry Glasbeek, The Politics of Rights: A Politics with Little
Class, 1 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 45, 55 (1992); Arthurs and Arnold, supra note 37, at 38. R
62 See, e.g., BOGART, supra note 37, at 74.
63 See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 15 (1993).
64 See, e.g., Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extra-Legal Activism Critical Legal Conscious-
ness and Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 937, 942 (2007).
65 Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v. Saskatchewan, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 245, 248 (Can.).
66 See, e.g., SCHEINGOLD, supra note 31 (one of the earliest and most comprehensive artic- R
ulations of the case that rights are a contingent resource, which can serve a number of extrale-
gal purposes).
67 See Albiston, supra note 37, at 63; Douglas, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. R
941, 969 (2011) (analyzing the literature on rights mobilization using this distinction).
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Turning first to the internal secondary effects, labor organizations can
use legal norms as a tool to build movements and collective power. The most
obvious way in which labor organizations can do this is by using collective
bargaining laws to organize workers. This avenue is mostly closed off for
farm workers because, with the exception of California and some of the
provinces in Canada (e.g. British Columbia, Manitoba), farm workers are
excluded from collective bargaining regimes.68 However, legal norms can
provide a language to name injustice and build a sense of entitlement, which
can shape and strengthen movements.69 Michael McCann argues that “legal
norms and traditions can become important elements in the process of ex-
plaining how existing relationships are unjust, in defining collective group
goals, and in constructing common identity among diversely situated citi-
zens.”70 So, even if migrant farm workers do not technically enjoy particular
labor rights, their exclusion from rights enjoyed by other workers can be
framed in a way that promotes mobilization.
With respect to secondary external effects, legal mobilization may be a
way to exact political concessions that would otherwise not be forthcom-
ing.71 For example, by launching a constitutional challenge in 2003, unions
managed to force the hand of the Ontario government to extend coverage of
the province’s health and safety laws to farm workers.72 This means that law
can be used as both a cultural and political resource.
E. Devising and enforcing private regulatory systems
The UFW routinely used consumer pressure to achieve better working
conditions for farm workers; the Delano grape boycott was the most visible
of these efforts.73 Similarly, as global economic production shifted in the
later twentieth century from vertically integrated corporations to global sup-
ply chains, activists turned to consumer pressure to force apparel companies
based in the Global North to take measures to improve working conditions
in their suppliers.74 From these efforts, activist-decreed codes of conduct,
voluntary corporate social responsibility initiatives, and private certification
systems (collectively “private regulatory systems”) developed to govern la-
68 See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act §152, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (1935) (defining
employee as excluding agricultural laborers).
69 See generally Catherine R. Albiston, Bargaining in the Shadow of Social Institutions:
Competing Discourses and Social Change in Workplace Mobilization of Civil Rights, 39 LAW
& SOC’Y REV. 11, 12 (2005); SCHEINGOLD, supra note 31; MCCANN, TAKING REFORM SERI- R
OUSLY, supra note 31. R
70 McCann, Law and Social Movements, supra note 31, at 25–26. R
71 See, e.g., Albiston, supra note 37, at 64. R
72 Tucker, supra note 16, at 274–75. R
73 MARTIN, supra note 3, at 68–69. R
74 See generally JILL LOUISE ESBENSHADE, MONITORING SWEATSHOPS: WORKERS, CON-
SUMERS, AND THE GLOBAL APPAREL INDUSTRY (2004); GAY W. SEIDMAN, BEYOND THE BOY-
COTT (2007).
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bor and environmental standards.75 Private regulatory systems usually have
four discernible components: (a) privately set standards determined by a va-
riety of stakeholders; (b) monitoring of compliance by accredited auditors;
(c) certification or recognition of participating firms; and (d) the provision of
information to consumers to institute boycotts in the event of non-
compliance.76
In some cases, these initiatives have been in operation for several de-
cades, and as a result, we know a great deal about the various factors that
make private regulation effective.77 Learning from these experiences, labor
organizations may be able to create domestic or transnational private regula-
tory systems, enforced through market sanctions, as a way to improve work-
ing conditions for the migrant farm worker community.
In Part II, I use the typology of legal engagements developed above to
consider the work of three labor organizations active in supporting migrant
farm workers in North America.
II. LEARNING FROM THE FIELD: THREE PROTOTYPICAL LABOR
ORGANIZATIONS
Generating sharp, socially-engaged scholarship requires learning from
organizations that are at the coalface of working with the migrant farm
worker community. Studying the work of labor organizations active in as-
sisting migrant farm workers can help provide insight into how the various
legal engagements operate in practice.
In the following section, I describe the work of three labor organiza-
tions—the AWA, JIM, and CIW—which I have studied using empirical
methods, such as reviewing archival material and conducting interviews
with key players. In the process of describing the labor organizations’ legal
engagements, I also examine their effectiveness against the background of
the political economy of the food system. The three main aspects of the
political economy that are relevant for evaluating the legal engagements of
labor organizations are: the way in which food is produced and consumed in
75 Tim Bartley, Institutional Emergence in an Era of Globalization: The Rise of Transna-
tional Private Regulation of Labor and Environmental Conditions, 113 AM. J. SOCIOL. 297,
300–06 (2007).
76 Id. at 301.
77 See, e.g., RICHARD M. LOCKE, THE PROMISE AND LIMITS OF PRIVATE POWER (2013);
Tim Bartley, Transnational Governance and the Re-Centered State: Sustainability or Legality,
8 REG. & GOVERNANCE 93, 96–101 (2014); Frederick Mayer & Gary Gereffi, Regulation and
Economic Globalization: Prospects and Limits of Private Governance, 12 BUS. & POL., no. 3,
1–2, 7–18 (2010); Dara O’Rourke, Monitoring the Monitors: A Critique of Corporate Third-
Party Labour Monitoring, in CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND LABOUR RIGHTS 196 (Rhys
Jenkins et al. eds., 2002). The literature on private regulation reveals several important lessons:
(1) the monitoring work of independent auditors is key to their implementation; (2) private
regulatory systems work best when private standards are “layered” with public standards and
local regulators are involved in their design and enforcement; (3) private regulations cannot
substitute for strong local workers’ movements and worker voice.
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the contemporary era; the nature of the regulatory systems that govern work-
ing conditions on farms; and the particular features of farm workers. The
ultimate purpose of my empirical work is to generate findings about what
legal engagements have allowed labor organizations to improve the working
conditions of migrant farm workers given the nature of the food system in
North America. The three aspects of the political economy identified above
require some explanation.
First, fruit and vegetable production sits within a vast, global food sys-
tem in which food is grown, processed, distributed, and ultimately con-
sumed. Although the agricultural sector, which grows and produces the raw
ingredients that become food, is a vital part, as Harriet Friedmann points out
“[f]ood, not agriculture, is the appropriate unifying principle of politics and
policy. . .[because]. . .[a]griculture has, in fact, been subordinated to food
industries and services by agro-food corporations during the past half-cen-
tury.”78 Three governing characteristics of the modern food system are: (1)
trade liberalization;79 (2) the growth of agribusinesses that operate transna-
tionally;80 and (3) concentration at every level of the food system.81 Each of
these features impacts the efficacy of strategies adopted by labor organiza-
tions. For example, due to the increasing competitive pressures faced by
farmers because of trade liberalization and concentration among buyers that
consequently exercize monopsony power, farmers seek to lower labor costs
and demand greater flexibility from their workers.82 To take account of these
broader trends, labor organizations might target those entities, such as buy-
ers, with the most power to effect working conditions.
Second, the regulatory systems that govern working conditions on
farms need to be carefully considered. Farm workers enjoy a patchwork of
federal and state/provincial protections in Canada and the United States, and
a number of different regulatory agencies hold mandates to enforce these
regulations. Labor organizations must carefully negotiate a variety of gaps in
78 Harriet Friedmann, Food Politics: New Dangers, New Possibilities, in FOOD AND AGRA-
RIAN ORDERS IN THE WORLD-ECONOMY 15, 29–30 (Philip McMichael ed., 1995).
79 See, e.g., Harriet Friedmann, The Political Economy of Food: A Global Crisis, 197 NEW
LEFT REV. 29, 47 (1993); Harriet Friedmann & Philip McMichael, Agriculture and the State
System: The Rise and Decline of National Agricultures, 1970s to the Present, 29 SOCIOLOGIA
RURALIS 93, 103 (1989) [hereinafter Friedmann & McMichael, Agriculture and the State Sys-
tem]; Philip McMichael, A Food Regime Genealogy, 36 J. OF PEASANT STUDIES 139, 150–51
(2009); Gabriela Pechlander & Gerardo Otero, The Neoliberal Food Regime: Neoregulation
and the New Division of Labor in North America, 75 RURAL SOCIOL. 179, 179 (2010).
80 See, e.g., CORPORATE POWER IN GLOBAL AGRIFOOD GOVERNANCE 1 (Jennifer Clapp and
Doris Fuchs eds., 2009); Friedman & McMichael, Agriculture and the State System, supra note
79, at 103; McMichael, A Food Regime Genealogy, supra note 79, at 145–46. R
81 See, e.g., PHILIP H. HOWARD, CONCENTRATION AND POWER IN THE FOOD SYSTEM
(2016); Kerry L. Preibisch, Local Produce, Foreign Labor: Labor Mobility Programs and
Global Trade Competitiveness in Canada, 72 RURAL SOC. 418, 427–28 (2007); U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, VOICES FROM THE WORKSHOPS ON AGRICULTURE AND ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN
OUR 21ST CENTURY ECONOMY AND THOUGHTS ON THE WAY FORWARD (2012).
82 See, e.g., Preibisch, supra note 81. R
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regulatory coverage and enforcement when they seek to assist migrant farm
workers.
Finally, it is no coincidence that farm workers tend to be primarily mi-
grants because their migrant status justifies and renders invisible their treat-
ment. In the United States, the agricultural sector historically provided ready
employment for waves of immigrants with few other job options—this in-
cluded the Chinese, Japanese and South Asian migrants before World War I,
and migrants from the Philippines and Mexico in the 1920s.83 Since the
1940s, the major group of immigrants obtaining waged work in agriculture
has been Mexicans.84 Another important component of the farm workforce is
temporary or seasonal migrant workers who enter the United States under
the H-2A visa program.85 The H-2A visa program allows temporary migrant
workers to enter the U.S. to fill temporary or seasonal need (defined as not
lasting longer than 12 months) where there are certified labor shortages.86
Although migrant farm workers under the H-2A program constitute a small
component of the total agricultural workforce, the number of H-2A workers
is quickly rising, with over a 100% increase noted in the period between
2012 and 2016.87 The H-2A visa program allows employers to bring in
workers from any eligible country, and in 2016, 134,368 H-2A visas were
issued.88 Undocumented migrant workers, however, comprise close to half
the crop worker population, a state of affairs that has prevailed since the
Bracero Program ended in 1964.89
83 See, e.g., CLETUS E. DANIEL, BITTER HARVEST 24–66, 108–09 (1981); MARTIN, supra
note 3, at 36–43. R
84 See, e.g., CALAVITA, supra note 32, at 55, 218 (stating that most of the Mexican work- R
ers who entered the United States between the period 1947–1964, did so under now-defunct
Bracero Program; at its peak, the Bracero Program supplied 445,000 workers annually to
farms); PHILIP L. MARTIN ET AL., THE NEW RURAL POVERTY 3–4, 13–18 (2006).
85 See, e.g., CINDY HAHAMOVITCH, NO MAN’S LAND 5 (2013) (noting that the precursor to
the modern H-2A program was the H-2 visa program, which until the 1980s mainly provided
temporary labor to sugar growers in Florida and fruit orchards in the North East); H-2A Visa,
JUSTICE IN MOTION (Nov. 4, 2017, 2:03 PM), http://www.globalworkers.org/visas/h-2a [https:/
/perma.cc/PCS4-AHZF]. H-2A workers are found in almost all fifty states of the U.S., and
work in crops ranging from apples to pears, tobacco to watermelons; however, H-2A workers
tend to be concentrated in South-Eastern U.S. (North Carolina, Georgia, Louisiana, and
Florida).
86 The rules governing the H-2A program are found in 8 U.S.C. § 1188 and Labor Certifi-
cation Process for Temporary Agricultural Employment in the United States (H-2A Workers),
20 C.F.R. Part 655, Subpart B (the duration of a H-2A visa is generally one year, but a worker
may apply to extend the visa as long as the maximum period of stay does not exceed 3 years.
Workers from over 84 countries, including Mexico, El Salvador, Honduras, Belize, Guatemala
and Jamaica, are eligible to participate).
87 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT OF THE VISA OFFICE (2016), Table XVI(B).
88 Id.
89 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL WORK-
ERS SURVEY, supra note 7, at 53 (finding 47% of workers surveyed did not have the proper R
work authorization); Philip L. Martin, Outlook: Immigration Reform and California Agricul-
ture, 67 CAL. AGRIC. 196, 198 (2013) (stating the proportion of undocumented workers in
California may be higher).
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The composition of the Canadian agricultural workforce provides an
interesting counterpoint. In Canada, seasonal or temporary migrant workers
entering under formal temporary migrant worker programs provide a signifi-
cant proportion of the farm workforce.90 An agriculture-specific temporary
migrant worker program has been in operation since 1966, known as the
Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program (“SAWP”), and these workers have
become a structurally embedded feature of the industry.91 It is generally as-
sumed that undocumented workers form only a very small component of the
workforce since the SAWP meets the agricultural sector’s labor needs. In
2015, 41,702 workers entered Canada under the SAWP.92 The SAWP allows
workers to be brought in for periods of up to eight months each year to work
in commodities deemed to be “seasonal.”93 The SAWP only allows farmers
to bring in workers from countries with which Canada has bilateral agree-
ments, which currently include Mexico, Jamaica and several other eastern
Caribbean states. The vast majority of these workers end up in Ontario
(58%), followed by British Columbia (17%) and Quebec (15%).94 In addi-
tion, employers can also bring in temporary workers under the Agricultural
Stream and the Stream for Low-Wage Positions of the general Temporary
Foreign Worker Program (“TFWP”) for longer durations (up to two years).
In 2015, 9,977 workers entered under the Agricultural Stream and a further
1,139 workers came under the Stream for Low-Wage Positions.95 The longer
duration of the TFWP makes it a valuable tool for employers seeking work-
ers for non-seasonal projects, such as, mushroom and greenhouse
production.96
In the next part, I set out the work of the AWA, JIM and CIW and
evaluate the various legal engagements of these organizations against the
political economy of the food system in North America.
90 See ANN WESTON AND LUIGI SCARPA DE MASELLIS, HEMISPHERIC INTEGRATION AND
TRADE RELATIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR CSAWP (2003) (noting that workers under the SAWP
contribute 45% of total employment hours in the commodities in which they are employed).
91 See generally VIC SATZEWICH, RACISM AND THE INCORPORATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR:
FARM LABOUR MIGRATION TO CANADA SINCE 1945 (1991).
92 GOV’T OF CANADA, ANNUAL LABOUR MARKET IMPACT ASSESSMENT STATISTICS 2008-
2015, PRIMARY AGRICULTURE STREAM, https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-develop
ment/services/foreign-workers/reports/2014/lmia-annual-statistics/agricultural.html [https://
perma.cc/B929-8UHY] (last visited Feb. 1, 2017) [hereinafter GOV’T OF CANADA, ANNUAL
LABOUR MARKET IMPACT ASSESSMENT STATISTICS] .
93 Eligible commodities include fruits, vegetables, mushrooms, and tobacco.
94 GOV’T OF CANADA, ANNUAL LABOUR MARKET IMPACT ASSESSMENT STATISTICS, supra
note 92. R
95 Id.
96 Kerry Preibisch, Pick-Your-Own Labor: Migrant Workers and Flexibility in Canadian
Agriculture, 44 INT. MIGR. REV. 404, 428–29 (2010).
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A. Agricultural Workers Alliance
The AWA, which is an initiative of the United Food and Commercial
Workers Canada (“UFCW”),97 operates a network of ten support centers in
rural Canada where large numbers of migrant farm workers are employed.
The support centers provide legal services, run information sessions, and
organize social events for migrant farm workers entering under the SAWP
and TFWP programs. Today, the AWA support centers are the “most acces-
sible support system for temporary migrant agricultural workers in
Canada.”98
In the summer of 2001, the UFCW, the Canadian Labour Congress and
a number of other labor organizations provided funding for volunteers to
travel around rural Southern Ontario to speak with migrant farm workers
about their conditions of employment and housing.99 Southern Ontario is a
fertile farming area that grows crops such as apples, peaches, pears, cherries,
asparagus, cucumbers, sugar beets, tobacco, and tomatoes.100 The majority of
migrant farm workers that enter Ontario under the SAWP work on farms in
this region.101 The project, known as the “Global Care Van Project” (“Cara-
van Project”), was “a portable outreach vehicle on wheels.” 102 The Caravan
Project spoke to migrant farm workers to find out about their experiences in
Canada. A former union organizer with the United Farm Workers (Canada),
Stan Raper, led the Caravan Project. He was joined by a number of Spanish-
speaking volunteers.
The Caravan Project made clear the need for a permanent center that
could provide assistance to the migrant farmworker community.103 The
UFCW had been trying to unionize SAWP farm workers since the 1970s,104
and given its limited success, the UFCW was moved to experiment with a
“worker center” model. Janice Fine describes worker centers as “commu-
nity-based mediating institutions that provide support to and organize among
communities of low-wage workers.”105 In 2002, UFCW established the first
97 This initiative is also known by the acronym “TUAC” in the province of Quebec.
98 Giselle Valarezo, A Voice for the Silenced: UFCW Canada and the National Campaign
to Empower Vulnerable Migrant Agricultural Workers, 2 J. ACTIVIST SCI. & TECH. EDUC. 20,
20 (2010).
99 See UFCW & CLC, NATIONAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 3. R
100 See SATZEWICH, supra note 91, at 57–58. R
101 See GOV’T OF CANADA, ANNUAL LABOUR MARKET IMPACT ASSESSMENT STATISTICS,
supra note 92. R
102 Wayne Hanley, The Roots of Organizing Agricultural Workers in Canada in CONSTITU-
TIONAL LABOUR RIGHTS IN CANADA 57, 66 (Fay Faraday et al. eds., 2012).
103 Kerry Preibisch, Forcing Governments to Govern in Defence of Noncitizen Workers: A
Story about the Canadian Labor Movement’s Alliance with Agricultural Migrants: An Inter-
view with Stan Raper, in ORGANIZING THE TRANSNATIONAL: LABOR, POLITICS, AND SOCIAL
CHANGE 115 (Luin Goldring & Sailaja Krishnamurti eds., 2007).
104 Donald Swartz, Labour Rights and Union Strategies, 69 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES/
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 447, 447 (2014).
105 FINE, supra note 2, at 11. R
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support center in Leamington, Ontario, a town at the epicenter of the agricul-
tural sector in Southern Ontario. Since then, nine other support centers have
opened—three in Ontario, three in British Columbia, two in Quebec, and
one other in Manitoba. In 2008, the UFCW launched the AWA to better
coordinate the work of the various support centers.
The UFCW provides the AWA with all of its funding. As a consequence
of this funding arrangement, the AWA operates as an outpost of the UFCW,
although the AWA provides its services to the migrant farm worker commu-
nity free of charge.
The AWA engages with the law in some very productive ways. First, the
AWA attempts to the build rights consciousness of workers throughout the
entire migration process, not just once workers are present in Canada. Sec-
ond, the AWA promotes compliance by facilitating claims that cross a num-
ber of jurisdictional boundaries by functioning as a “one-stop shop” for
workers. On the other hand, my analysis of the AWA’s legal engagements
also reveals one fundamental limitation: the AWA has aggressively pursued
litigation as a tool to win social change without any significant effort to
marry its judicial strategy with political mobilization.
1. Building rights consciousness across the entire labor migration
cycle
The migrant status of farm workers requires interventions to build legal
consciousness that span the entire “labor migration cycle.”106 The AWA’s
rights consciousness work recognizes that workers’ knowledge of their legal
rights can be improved before they arrive in their destination country, during
the process of migration, and after they have arrived. The AWA acts at each
of these points.
First, the AWA has established formal relationships with authorities in
Mexico to distribute material about Canadian laws to workers before they
arrive in Canada. To achieve this objective, the AWA recently signed several
agreements with Mexican state and municipal agencies.107 Using these local
partners, the AWA works to inform workers of their rights under the SAWP
and TFWP, the applicable provincial labor regulations, and the locations of
support centers that can assist workers who encounter difficulties. Although
the Mexican authorities do provide some information to workers before they
106 FAY FARADAY, MADE IN CANADA: HOW THE LAW CONSTRUCTS MIGRANT WORKERS’
INSECURITY 5–6 (2012) (describing the concept of “labor migration cycle” in the context of
the range of interventions necessary to assist workers entering under temporary migrant
worker programs, but which can also be used in relation to recent immigrants and undocu-
mented workers).
107 See, e.g., UFCW Canada and Michoacan’s SEMIGRANTE Sign New Agreement to
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depart Mexico about their employment-related rights in Canada, the infor-
mation that they provide is often partial and incomplete. Recently, some
evidence came to light that Mexican authorities had advised their citizens
not to participate in union organizing because they feared that employer
complaints could jeopardize the continuance of the SAWP.108
Second, after the workers arrive, the AWA is able to access migrant
farm workers by having support centers based in rural areas of Canada
where the farming sector is concentrated (e.g. Southwestern Ontario, Fraser
Valley and the Okanagan region in British Columbia, Portage La Prairie in
Manitoba, and Saint-Eustache in Que´bec). Once they establish contact with
the workers, the support centers educate workers about their rights and enti-
tlements using multi-lingual pamphlets and workshops.
Third, in more recent times, the AWA has started to work closely with
the Mexican consulates in Canada to improve their knowledge of local laws.
Before the AWA began its work, the consulates lacked the resources to help
workers,109 and in any event, they were insufficiently motivated to help their
compatriots.110 The AWA’s work has resulted in the slow evolution in the
attitude of staff at the Mexican consulate based in Leamington.111 Xo´chitl
Bada and Shannon Gleeson recently surveyed the extensive engagements
that civil society organizations had with Mexican consular offices in the
United States, which included consulates referring matters to relevant orga-
nizations and working together to process claims.112 The Mexican consulates
in Canada are still far from being this cooperative,113 and in fact, closer
working relationships of this sort may not be possible in the Canadian con-
text given the structural features of the SAWP.114 But even in the absence of
these closer forms of cooperation, the AWA has been instrumental in inform-
108 See Certain Emps. of Sidhu & Sons Nursery Ltd. and Sidhu & Sons Nursery Ltd. v.
UFCW, Local 1518, BCLRB No. B56/2014 (Can.), at 10 (alleging in proceedings before the
British Columbia Labour Relations Board that Mexican workers were informed by representa-
tives of the Mexican government not to participate in union activity while in Canada).
109 VEENA VERMA, THE MEXICAN AND CARIBBEAN SEASONAL AGRICULTURAL WORKER
PROGRAM (2003), http://s3.amazonaws.com/migrants_heroku_production/datas/95/
Verma_2003_original.pdf [https://perma.cc/CGP2-LQZJ].
110 Christine Hughes, Costly Benefits and Gendered Costs: Guatemalans’ Experiences of
Canada’s “Low-Skill Pilot Project,” in LEGISLATED INEQUALITY: TEMPORARY LABOR MIGRA-
TION IN CANADA 146–47 (Patti Tamara Lenard & Christine Straehle eds., 2012).
111 Interview with Stan Raper, AWA Coordinator, conducted by phone (Dec. 15, 2015)
[hereinafter Raper, Interview].
112 Xo´chitl Bada & Shannon M. Gleeson, A New Approach to Migrant Labor Rights En-
forcement: The Crisis of Undocumented Worker Abuse and Mexican Consular Advocacy in the
United States, 40 LAB. STUDIES J. 32, 39–47 (2015).
113 Raper, Interview, supra note 111. R
114 The Mexican state, which has become dependent on the remittances sent back to Mex-
ico by farm workers, has an interest in seeing the SAWP continue. Under the SAWP, the
Mexican state acts as a broker that selects workers and facilitates workers’ emigration. Fear of
jeopardizing the program may dampen enthusiasm for more zealous advocacy by the Mexican
government on behalf of its citizens.
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ing consular staff about the workers’ legal entitlements while in Canada so
that they can pass this information on to their citizens.115
Government departments in Canada, at both the federal and provincial
level, only provide information to workers once the workers have arrived in
the country. In this context, simply providing information about workers’
rights in an impartial and comprehensive manner at the various stages of the
migration cycle, represents an important legal engagement.
2. Promoting compliance with a range of laws
The staff and volunteers at the AWA support centers do a large amount
of casework to help the workers claim their existing legal rights. The support
centers have helped workers with wage theft claims under provincial em-
ployment standards legislation; claims for Employment Insurance, Canada
Pension Plan, and Quebec Pension Plan; obtaining coverage under provin-
cial medical schemes; and workers’ compensation claims.116 The casework
involves speaking to workers to find out about their issues, advising them of
their rights, filling out forms, and helping workers navigate the process of
making a claim.117 Workers can either come in person to see a staff member
or volunteer at the AWA support centers, or alternatively, the AWA operates
a 24-hour hotline that can answer any questions that workers may have.118 In
2010, for example, the support centers responded to 35,000 enquiries in the
form of drop-in visits, phone calls, and outreach to workers on farms.119
This aspect of the AWA’s work supplements the efforts of regulatory
agencies to receive and process claims in two main ways. First, the various
public agencies are responsible only for enforcing the standards in their do-
mains, and farm workers may have problems that cross a number of areas
such as employment, health and safety, housing, and immigration. The AWA
centers provide advice and support in a way that prioritizes the needs of the
workers, which public regulators are unable to do because they operate in a
more compartmentalized fashion. Second, once a complaint is lodged, Cana-
dian regulatory agencies make little serious effort to meet the needs of work-
ers who lead lives in multiple countries. The AWA operates an online
database that helps workers keep track of their claims once a complaint has
been lodged with a government agency.120 The database is particularly im-
portant for migrant workers because it allows them to track their claims and
115 See Christina Gabriel & Laura Macdonald, Citizenship at the Margins: The Canadian
Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program and Civil Society Advocacy, 39 POLITICS & POL’Y 45,
55 (2011).
116 See UFCW, 2011 Report, supra note 6, at 12–14. R
117 See Raper, Interview, supra note 111. R
118 See Valarezo, supra note 98, at 23. R
119 UFCW, 2011 Report, supra note 6, at 11–12. R
120 Id.
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provide any requested information to keep the claims progressing even when
the workers are no longer in Canada.
The assistance that the AWA provides to workers to make legal claims
runs up against the problem that most workers are afraid to complain. Work-
ers under the SAWP and TFWP cannot meaningfully exercise their labor
rights because the spectre of deportation haunts them.121 Workers are fearful
that lodging a claim against their employer could result in retaliation in the
form of the termination of their employment, which could lead to their de-
portation.122 The SAWP allows farm employers the power to unilaterally ter-
minate a worker’s employment. Unless the structural features of the SAWP
and TFWP programs, which makes workers reliant on their employer’s be-
neficence are first addressed, the AWA’s strategy of facilitating legal claims
is unlikely to lead to significantly more workers asserting their rights.123
3. Using litigation to win collective bargaining rights
The UFCW, along with the National Union of Public and General Un-
ions (“NUPGU”), has been at the forefront of seeking collective bargaining
rights for migrant farm workers by making the argument that section 2(d) of
the Canadian Charter of Rights of Freedom124 (“Canadian Charter”), which
provides a guarantee of freedom of association, protects the right to collec-
tively bargain. This litigation commenced before the formation of the AWA,
and indeed even before the founding of the first support center in 2002, but
there is an important link with farm workers: the original case was brought
by the AWA’s patron on behalf of farm workers in Ontario because they were
121 See, e.g., Tanya Basok et al., Reproducing Deportability: Migrant Agricultural Work-
ers in South-western Ontario, 40 J. OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES 1394, 1394 (2014);
Gabrielle E. Clark, Coercion and Contract at the Margins: Deportable Labor and the Laws of
Employment Termination Under U.S. Capitalism (1942–2015), L. & SOC. INQUIRY at 1, 3, 5,
7–8 (early access, Nov. 4, 2016); Judy Fudge & Fiona MacPhail, The Temporary Foreign
Worker Program in Canada: Low-Skilled Workers as an Extreme Form of Flexible Labour, 31
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 5, 43–44 (2009); Leah F. Vosko, Blacklisting as a Modality of
Deportability: Mexico’s Response to Circular Migrant Agricultural Workers’ Pursuit of Col-
lective Bargaining Rights in British Columbia, Canada, 42 J. OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION
STUDIES 1371, 1373–74 (2016); Mimi Zou, The Legal Construction of Hyper-Dependence and
Hyper-Precarity in Migrant Work Relations, 31 INT’L J. OF COMP. LAB. L. 141, 151 (2015).
122 See, e.g., Chris Ensing, Labrador Whistleblowers’ ‘Heart is Broken,’ Faces Deporta-
tion, CBC NEWS (Jan. 26, 2017), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/newfoundland-labrador/tfw-
deportation-labrador-city-arhur-lorenzo-1.3953077 [https://perma.cc/A5WQ-WWGG]
(describing how a migrant worker faced deportation after engaging in workplace advocacy);
Aaron M. Orkin et al., Medical Repatriation of Migrant Farm Workers in Ontario: A Descrip-
tive Analysis, 2 CAN. MED. ASSOC. J. E192, E192 (2014) (finding that in 2001–2011, 787
repatriations occurred in Ontario, mostly for medical reasons).
123 A number of features of the SAWP increase the vulnerability of farm workers by mak-
ing them dependent on their employer’s goodwill. For example, if a worker’s employment is
terminated, they lose their right to remain in the country unless they can find an alternative
employer. Further, if a worker would like to return to Canada for future harvesting seasons,
they must receive their employer’s nomination. These features of the program make workers
reluctant to complain.
124 Canadian Charter, supra note 60. R
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excluded from the province’s collective bargaining regime. The UFCW (and
NUPGU) had multiple reasons for bringing this litigation. One was to pro-
vide protection for farm workers in Ontario to collectively organize, not-
withstanding the challenges of organizing workers under the Wagner Act-
model of collective bargaining.125 A second rationale was to use collective
bargaining as a way to challenge the agricultural sector’s reliance on tempo-
rary migrant workers.126 In Alberta and Manitoba where farm workers enjoy
collective bargaining rights, the UFCW has been able to negotiate collective
agreements requiring farm employers to nominate temporary migrant work-
ers to obtain permanent residency through the Provincial Nominee Program
(PNP). The PNP allows provinces to select categories of migrants that they
want promoted for permanent residence. Yet another motivation was to halt
the gradual corrosion of statutory collective bargaining rights for all
workers.127
The UFCW’s attempt to use the Canadian Charter to entrench collec-
tive bargaining rights commenced in the late 1990s, and has seen a number
of twists and turns since it began.128 Farm workers in Ontario have been
excluded from the collective bargaining regime that was implemented in On-
tario in the 1950s, with the exception of a very brief period.129 In 2001, the
UFCW brought a case on behalf of the excluded farm workers, arguing that
the exclusion of agricultural workers from the province’s general labor rela-
tions statute constituted a violation of these workers’ freedom of association
rights. The Supreme Court ruled that farm workers were entitled to the “ex-
ercise of certain collective activities, such as making majority representa-
tions to one’s employer.” 130 However, the conservative provincial
government in power at the time responded by enacting the Agricultural
Employee Protection Act131 (“AEPA”), a specific collective bargaining re-
gime for agricultural workers that only narrowly complied with the court’s
ruling. The AEPA only allowed farm workers to present their claims to the
employer, without any concomitant duty on the employer to consider these
representations in good faith, and further, deprived farm workers of the right
125 See supra note 25. R
126 See generally Naveen Mehta, A Changing Union Tide Hurts Vulnerable Workers, in
UNIONS MATTER 115 (Matthew Behrens ed., 2014).
127 See LARRY SAVAGE & CHARLES W. SMITH, UNIONS IN COURT (2017); Eric Tucker,
Shall Wagnerism Have No Dominion?, 21 JUST LAB.: CAN. J. OF WORK & SOC’Y 1, 2 (2014).
128 See, e.g., FAY FARADAY, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LABOUR RIGHTS IN CANADA 5–6, 15
(Faraday et al. eds., 2012) (containing insightful commentary on the Canadian Charter litiga-
tion, including discussion of the decisions’ social context); Kevin Banks et al., 16 CAN. LAB.
EMP. L.J. 177, 184, 234, 303–04, 327–29, 336–37, 361–64, 372–76, 420 (focusing on the legal
implications of the litigation).
129 Tucker, supra note 25, at 36. R
130 Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney Gen.), [2001] S.C.R. 1016, para. 30 (Can.).
131 Agriculture Employees Protection Act, S.O. 2002, c. 16 (Can.).
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to take strike action to further their claims.132 The UFCW’s efforts to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of the AEPA failed, and it was found to pass con-
stitutional muster.133 More recently, in response to another unrelated legal
challenge, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that section 2(d) also protects
the right to strike,134 and since the AEPA does not explicitly protect this
aspect of collective bargaining, its current legal status is once again unclear.
The decade-long litigation did not ultimately result in meaningful col-
lective bargaining rights for farm workers. Some critics have pointed out
that the UFCW/AWA’s orientation to the courts diverted valuable resources
from more active political forms of struggle, such as organizing protest ac-
tions and lobbying Parliament to change the laws.135 Drawing on the typol-
ogy of legal engagements described, which emphasizes the cultural and
political dimensions of litigation, the more salient critique is that the UFCW/
AWA failed to treat litigation as a cultural and political resource to
strengthen movements and win political concessions.
The UFCW did not use litigation to build a popular movement, because
it did not use the constitutional claim to tactically build public support and
encourage popular mobilization, what Fay Faraday and Eric Tucker call
“democratic constitutionalism.”136 For these authors, claims that have a con-
stitutional imprimatur communicate that they “are supported by the funda-
mental and widely shared norms of a just society.”137 During the life of the
litigation to win collective bargaining rights for farm workers, the UFCW
did not actively attempt to mobilize popular support among workers and the
public.138 Not only did the UFCW/AWA fail to mobilize workers and their
allies to take collective political action, its stated position implied that col-
lective action could only result once legally sanctioned collective bargaining
rights were achieved. The lack of a vibrant political campaign running
alongside the constitutional litigation also meant that the UFCW could not
use the court action to win political concessions when the courts proved
unreceptive to the UFCW’s arguments.
In fact, the UFCW/AWA’s focus on constitutional litigation to win col-
lective bargaining rights shows that legal action can sometimes act as a con-
servative force that undermines more radical avenues. SAWP workers
regularly engage in illegal “wildcat” strikes when conditions become un-
132 C.f. David J. Doorey, Graduated Freedom of Association: Worker Voice Beyond the
Wagner Model, 38 QUEEN’S L.J. 512, 525–26 (arguing that the AEPA has some unrealized
potential because it provides protection for farm workers to form collective organizations).
133 Attorney Gen. of Ontario v. Fraser, [2011] S.C.R. 3, 166 (Can.).
134 Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v. Saskatchewan, [2015] S.C.R. 245 (Can.).
135 Jonah Butovsky & Murray E.G. Smith, Beyond Social Unionism: Farm Workers in
Ontario and Some Lessons from Labour History, 70 LABOUR/LE TRAVAIL 69, 70, 93 (2007).
136 Fay Faraday & Eric Tucker, Who Owns Charter Values? in UNIONS MATTER 125,
126–29 (Matthew Behrens, ed., 2014).
137 Id. at 126.
138 See, e.g., SAVAGE & SMITH, UNIONS IN COURT, supra note 127. R
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bearable.139 For example, workers have set down their tools and left the em-
ployer’s premises to protest imminent health and safety hazards. The UFCW/
AWA’s commitment to legally sanctioned collective bargaining prevented it
from actively supporting these spontaneous and extra-legal forms of activ-
ity.140 Given the difficulties that migrant farm workers have collectively or-
ganizing under the Wagner-Act model, these other forms of strike activity
might hold more promise for improving working conditions.141 It is worth
remembering that some of the UFW’s early successes in California in the
1960s occurred as a result of wildcat strikes that took place in the absence of
labor relations legislation.142 If the UFCW and AWA were not so heavily
invested in officially sanctioned channels of collective bargaining, they
might have been more open to recognizing and supporting extant expres-
sions of collective power.
B. Justice in Motion
JIM is a unique organization based Brooklyn, United States that links
employment advocates representing migrant farm workers with its network
of Human Rights Defenders (“Defenders”) in the workers’ home coun-
tries.143 Advocates who launch private litigation in the United States on be-
half of migrant workers soon find that the workers’ transient status presents
an enormous barrier to succeeding in court. Litigation often takes years to
complete, and in most cases, migrant farm workers have returned to their
countries of origin while the litigation process trudges on, with neither the
means nor resources to stay involved in the process. The Defenders can as-
sist because they have easier access to these workers once they have re-
turned to their home countries. The Defenders can recruit workers for
pending class actions, meet in person with the workers, organize depositions
at their offices, ask the workers to fill out any outstanding paperwork, and
facilitate the distribution of settlement or award amounts. In the words of
JIM’s founder and Executive Director, Cathleen Caron, JIM has pioneered a
form of “portable justice” for transnational workers who are denied their
entitlements because of the strict procedural requirements created by court-
based rights adjudication.144
139 See, e.g., Smith, Racialized Justice, supra note 44, at 27 n. 61. R
140 See Butovsky & Smith, supra note 135, at 84. R
141 Tucker, supra note 25, at 46, 50, 55–56 (arguing that farm workers have not been able R
to organize under this model, and in fact, strategies that “skirt around” the law might hold
more promise).
142 MARTIN, supra note 3, at 66–71. R
143 The change in name from Global Workers Justice Alliance, which took place in January
2017, was in recognition of the fact that JIM had moved beyond labor issues to focus on
raising awareness about migrant exploitation more generally, to include matters such as aban-
donment, violence, persecution and human trafficking.
144 Cathleen Caron, Portable Justice, Global Workers, and the United States, 40
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 549, 550 (2007).
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In 2016, JIM’s Defenders allowed 111 legal actions to proceed that oth-
erwise might not have.145 JIM’s Defender network assists advocates working
with a range of migrant workers, including those working on farms, in food
processing, and in hospitality. Roughly one-third of the cases that come
through JIM’s doors are related to labor exploitation on farms.146
At present, JIM obtains the majority of its funding from two large pri-
vate philanthropic foundations: Neo Philanthropy and Public Welfare. These
foundations provide crucial funding to numerous progressive social causes.
There are, however, quite a few drawbacks to relying on this type of fund-
ing. For example, the money can suddenly disappear if a foundation decides
that its priorities lie elsewhere147 and the process of applying for these funds,
abiding by the terms of the award, and completing acquittal reports is ex-
tremely resource-intensive.148 To overcome these drawbacks, JIM is looking
to diversify its funding by appealing to individual donors.149
1. Building rights consciousness
JIM builds the rights consciousness of workers entering the United
States by working closely with its Defenders, which form the backbone of
JIM. JIM finds and trains organizations and individuals in migrant worker
sending countries to form the network. At present, the Defender network is
made up of close to 40 organizations and individuals in Mexico, Guatemala,
El Salvador, Nicaragua and Honduras.150 Most organizational members of
the Defender network are not labor organizations; they include feminist, In-
digenous and Catholic Church legal clinics.151 The Defender network also
includes three individual Defenders.152 JIM works with the Defenders and its
other partners to distribute material on workers’ rights to workers in their
own countries, and prior to their departure for the United States.
For two main reasons, the Defenders operate as effective “community
brokers” and intermediaries to build the rights consciousness of workers.
First, the Defenders are in a unique position to disseminate information to
workers because they can utilize local partnerships and media to spread the
message. For example, the Jornaleros SAFE project, which began in May
2010 as a joint endeavor between JIM, three organizations from the United
145 E-mail from Cathleen Caron, Justice in Motion to author (Jan. 24, 2017, 16:24 EST)
(on file with author).
146 JUSTICE IN MOTION, 2016 RESULTS (on file with author).
147 Previously, JIM received most of its funding from the Ford and McArthur Foundations,
but this funding came to an end when these foundations shifted their focus.
148 See, e.g., THE REVOLUTION WILL NOT BE FUNDED: BEYOND THE NON-PROFIT INDUS-
TRIAL COMPLEX (Incite! Women of Color Against Violence ed., 2007).
149 Telephone Interview with Cathleen Caron, Exec. Dir., Justice in Motion (Dec. 21,
2015) [hereinafter Caron, Interview].
150 Global Workers Justice Alliance, Defenders, http://www.globalworkers.org/advocates/
defender-network [https://perma.cc/TJ3B-7LN2] (last visited Feb. 2, 2017).
151 Id.
152 Id.
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States, one Mexican organization, and one Mexican foundation, estimates
that it has been able to reach more than 100,000 workers through community
radio to inform them of their rights as agricultural workers.153 The Defenders
have also educated thousands of Mexican workers about the “Chamba Mex-
ico” case, one of Mexico’s largest recruitment fraud schemes.154 Second,
these Defenders raise the rights consciousness of the workers because they
can reach them where they live, and since the Defenders often come from
the same communities as the workers themselves, the workers have a high
degree of trust in them. This allows the Defenders to provide information in
a way that avoids the suspicion and skepticism, which often greets U.S.-
based actors.
2. Improving compliance by facilitating private enforcement across
borders
The Defenders’ main role is to facilitate the private employment actions
of workers who lead transnational lives. Migrant farm workers have a num-
ber of statutory rights in the United States,155 although in practice, immigra-
tion laws often intersect with labor protections to make their realization
difficult.156 Although these statutory rights are enforced by federal and state
153 GLOBAL WORKERS JUSTICE ALLIANCE, MEXICAN H2A FARM WORKERS IN THE U.S.:
THE INVISIBLE WORKFORCE, JORNALEROS SAFE REPORT, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2013),
www.globalworkers.org/our-work/publications/jornaleros-safe [https://perma.cc/WD8U-
LZBX].
154 Our Impact: Program Summaries (2014), GLOBAL WORKERS JUSTICE ALLIANCE, http://
www.globalworkers.org/our-work/successes/2014-year-review [https://perma.cc/RY32-
3HHQ] (last visited Feb 2, 2017).
155 In the federal sphere, the minimum wage provisions in the FLSA apply to farm work-
ers employed at farms with more than 10 full-time workers, although farm employers contin-
ued to be exempt from overtime provisions. Further, the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural
Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1872 (1983) (AWPA) establishes a number of spe-
cific employment standards for migrant and seasonal agricultural workers, including those
relating to housing, transport, and record-keeping. Most importantly, the AWPA requires the
registration of farm labor contractors and makes farm employers and farm contractors jointly
responsible for worker entitlements. The AWPA does not apply to workers under the H-2A
program because specific regulations cover their employment. Under these regulations, the
Department of Labor enforces wage rates and contractual obligations that farm employers have
towards H-2A workers, such as the guarantee that workers will be provided with 75% of the
hours they were contractually promised, transportation and housing requirements, and disclo-
sure and record-keeping duties. These regulations operate as provisions in the employee’s con-
tract of employment. In addition, workers are also covered by the Occupational Health and
Safety Act, 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq. (1980), and a range of civil rights legislation. Laws in the
various states may provide farm workers with greater rights. For example, in California, farm
workers must receive the state minimum wage ($10.50 per hour as opposed to the federal
$7.25), and will soon have an entitlement to overtime pay.
156 See Maria Ontiveros, Migrant Labour in the United States: Working Beneath the Floor
for Free Labour?, in MIGRANTS AT WORK: IMMIGRATION AND VULNERABILITY IN LABOUR
LAW 11–13 (Cathryn Costello and Mark Freedland eds., 2014).
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government agencies,157 some statutes, such as the FLSA, also contain a pri-
vate right of enforcement.158 Critics argue that the Department of Labor does
not do a sufficient job of enforcement,159 and therefore, private actions fill an
enforcement void left by public agencies. However, private enforcement can
never fully substitute for public efforts because workers bear a steep cost in
claiming their rights through the court system.160
Private litigation, notwithstanding its limitations, can have three main
benefits. First and foremost, it provides remedies for workers who have been
denied their entitlements. Second, it acts as a deterrent to the specific em-
ployer targeted by the action, sending a clear message that any future viola-
tion will be punished. Finally, private actions can act as a general deterrent
to other farm employers in the same industry or locality who may operate
under the assumption that they will face no consequences for breaching the
rights of their employees.
Litigation filed on behalf of workers often proceeds as class actions.161
These procedures offer an efficient way of achieving all three objectives.162
Private actions for individual farm workers are not usually viable because of
the small amounts of money involved—even if the action is successful, the
amount recovered might not meet the legal costs of bringing the claim. Class
actions allow employment advocates to aggregate a number of claims so that
the sum awarded meets all legal fees. The damages that can be awarded in
class action cases also tend to be much higher, and as a result, these cases
have a much bigger specific and general deterrence effect.163
Due to the transient nature of the lives that migrant workers lead, em-
ployment advocates face a number of barriers to bringing legal claims on
157 These agencies include, for example, the federal Department of Labor (Wage & Hour
Division and Occupational Health and Safety Administration), and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, or state equivalents.
158 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
159 See, e.g., FARMWORKER JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 36–40. R
160 See Weil & Pyles, supra note 38, at 63–65. R
161 This includes collective actions under the FLSA or class actions under rules of civil
procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 and similar state civil procedure rules allow for class actions in
many cases (for both statutory claims and common law claims—e.g. under anti-discrimination
law, some state wage/hour laws, common law) when certain factual conditions are met. In
class action litigation, individual class members are automatically included in any resolution
unless they affirmatively opt-out. In contrast, the FLSA has a different and more difficult “opt-
in” procedure that is commonly referred to as a collective, or representative, action—“An
action to recover the liability prescribed in either of the preceding sentences may be main-
tained against any employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State court of com-
petent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves
and other employees similarly situated. No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such
action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed
in the court in which such action is brought” (§ 261(b)).
162 Telephone Interview with Nan Schivone, Leg. Dir., Justice in Motion (Jan. 6, 2015)
[hereinafter, Schivone, Interview].
163 Cf. Samuel Estreicher & Zev J. Eigen, The Forum for Adjudication of Employment
Disputes, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 5
(Cynthia L. Estlund & Michael L. Wachter eds., 2013) (noting the important caveat that court
adjudication of employment disputes favor the well-resourced).
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their behalf. At the outset, lawyers have difficulty getting access to the
workers, who generally live in housing on the employers’ property.164 Once a
claim is lodged, advocates may need to obtain further information from af-
fected workers during the litigation process. Even after a claim has com-
menced, there are several procedural rules that prevent migrant workers
from accessing justice.165 For example, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
require plaintiffs in a lawsuit to participate in pre-trial discovery, which may
include providing in-person testimony about the case.166 In circumstances
where a farm worker has returned to their home country, advocates may
have difficulty getting in touch with their clients to ensure their participation
in the case.
To overcome these challenges, JIM links Defenders with employment
advocates in the United States, acting as an intermediary to facilitate the
litigation process. The Defenders can locate clients in their home countries
and tell them about the opportunity to join litigation, help clients answer
interrogatories, organize telephonic or on-site depositions, and assist with
settlement and award distribution.167 The Defenders can navigate their local
terrain, for example, circumventing some of the security threats created by
the illicit “Narco trade.”168 They may be able to find clients who have lost
contact with their advocates, and through personal interaction, encourage
workers to exercise their rights and seek justice for legal violations. In many
cases, Defenders are able to carry out these tasks because the workers, who
may be fearful or distrustful of outsiders for a variety of reasons, place trust
in them by virtue of being part of the same community.169
Defenders based in Mexico and Guatemala were recently instrumental
to the success of two cases involving farm workers.170 The first concerned a
claim against a large citrus company based in Florida. Orange pickers under
the H-2A program who were paid a “piece rate”171 alleged that they were
not provided with the “Adverse Effect Wage Rate”172 for Florida. The col-
164 Letter from Sarah Paoletti, Dir., Transnational Legal Clinic, Univ. of Penn. to Emilio
A´lvarez Icaza Longoria, Exec. Sec’y, Inter-Am. Comm’n on Hum. Rts. (Aug. 13, 2014) (on file
with author) (stating that the U.S. does not have a consistent federal legal framework that
governs advocates’ access to migrant workers living on camps; a confusing array of state laws,
court decisions, and Attorney-General opinions regulate camp access, and in practice, local
officials routinely ignore the legal protections even when they do exist).
165 Caron, Interview, supra note 149. R
166 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16.
167 See Caron, supra note 144. R
168 Caron, Interview, supra note 149. R
169 Whitney Eulich, For Migrants, A Push for Cross-Border Justice, THE CHRISTIAN SCI-
ENCE MONITOR (Dec. 14, 2015), http://humantrafficking.csmonitor.com/for-mexicos-migrants-
push-for-cross-border-justice [https://perma.cc/AY4T-YB9Y].
170 Schivone, Interview, supra note 162. R
171 In this case, the workers were provided with a rate of pay based on the amount of
oranges picked.
172 20 C.F.R. 655.120 (employers of H-2A workers must provide the highest of the Ad-
verse Effect Wage Rate, the prevailing hourly wage or piece rate, the agreed-upon collective
bargaining wage, or the Federal or State minimum wage).
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lective action that Florida Rural Legal Services initiated on behalf of the
workers stalled because the Middle District Court of Florida required that
affected workers provide signed interrogatories, and many workers had al-
ready returned to Oaxaca, Mexico. JIM connected the lawyers with a De-
fender based in the region who managed to collect the signed interrogatories.
In another collective action against a large vegetable producer for violations
relating to unpaid transportation costs, the Georgia Legal Services needed
the services of a Defender in Guatemala to obtain the signed consent of
workers. Both cases resulted in settlements.
Private enforcement, even accounting for class actions, can be likened
to putting out spot fires and it is doubtful whether it has the capacity to drive
long-term improvements in the agricultural sector. Most workers are afraid
to pursue a legal claim against their employer for fear of retaliation.173 Other
barriers to filing a claim may result from perceptions about the ineffective-
ness or unfairness of the process.174 Further, even if a claim is filed, most
claims are settled privately rather than being resolved by a court. Accord-
ingly, these matters do not become a matter of public record, and therefore,
do not demonstrate to other employers the dangers of non-compliance.
Recognizing this fact, JIM has recently redoubled its efforts to advocate
for systemic change to the immigration system and to assist its Defenders
fight for more protective laws in their home states. JIM has built up a “trans-
national advocacy network” that it is putting to use for this new purpose.
Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink describe a transnational advocacy net-
work as “actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together
by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information
and services.”175 Although this facet of JIM’s work is relatively new, by
facilitating the exchange of knowledge between itself, advocates and De-
fenders based in migrant-sending countries, the transnational advocacy net-
work has the potential to influence legal and policy outcomes in multiple
jurisdictions. Further, as sending states strengthen local laws, and as legal
capacity to bring claims gradually develops among the Defenders, Caron
predicts that the network will start to engage in more litigation in migrant-
sending countries.176
C. Coalition of Immokalee Workers
The CIW is a grassroots collective of workers based in Immokalee, a
small town in the Southwest horn of Florida. The CIW formed in the early
1990s when a group of farm workers from Mexico, Haiti and Guatemala
decided to come together to take action to improve the dismal conditions on
173 See, e.g., Weil & Pyles, supra note 38, at 63–64. R
174 Id.
175 MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS 2 (1998).
176 Caron, Interview, supra note 149. R
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Florida’s fields. Recognizing that farm workers in Florida enjoyed few legal
rights, and that government agencies were indifferent to enforcing the lim-
ited rights that workers did have, the CIW decided to pursue a different path.
Today, the CIW is best known for the Fair Food Program, which covers
the tomato industry in Florida. Florida produces 50% of the total volume of
tomatoes consumed in the United States each year,177 and during the winter
months, Florida meets 90% of the country’s tomato needs.178 The Fair Food
Program binds participating large-scale buyers of tomatoes, such as fast food
chains and supermarkets, to purchase tomatoes from growers observing la-
bor standards set out in the Fair Food Code of Conduct & Selected Guidance
(“Code of Conduct”). The CIW pressured buyers to purchase their produce
from participating growers by mobilizing public support. It waged a public
campaign that threatened fast food chains, food service companies and su-
permarkets with loss of business and damage to reputation unless they
agreed to take responsibility for labor conditions in their supply chains.179 At
present, the Fair Food Program covers 90% of tomato growers in Florida,
which employ close to 30,000 migrant farm workers.180 If a grower refuses
to sign on to the Code of Conduct, or is found in persistent breach of its
terms, it loses the ability to sell produce to participating buyers.
Prior to the CIW’s efforts, labor conditions on Florida’s tomato farms
were some of the worst in the country.181 Workers would toil for 10–12 hours
each day in blistering heat to pick tomatoes for which they were paid 40
177 Tomato 101, THE FLA. TOMATO COMM., https://www.floridatomatoes.org/tomato-101
[https://perma.cc/Y829-RGST] (last visited Oct. 6, 2017).
178 Steven Greenhouse, In Florida Tomato Fields, a Penny Buys Progress, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/25/business/in-florida-tomato-fields-a-
penny-buys-progress.html [https://perma.cc/2JKG-4NZZ].
179 Since 2000, the CIW has been campaigning to pressure large buyers of Florida’s toma-
toes to sign on to the Fair Food Program. The CIW first targeted the fast food giant, Taco Bell,
owned by Yum! Foods, which also owns the KFC and Pizza Hut chains. At first, Taco Bell was
unwilling to agree to the CIW’s terms, citing the fact that the working conditions in its suppli-
ers had little to do with the company. After a grueling five-year campaign, Yum! Foods even-
tually capitulated. The CIW’s national campaign, run in concert with students and faith groups,
was able to cause commercial damage to Taco Bell and credibly threaten Taco Bell’s reputa-
tion. The boycott of Taco Bell that the CIW called between 2000 and 2005 was aided by the
Student/Farmworker Alliance (SFA), which managed to pressure 25 schools, colleges and uni-
versities to either remove or prevent new Taco Bell restaurants opening, or to end sponsorship
agreements with Taco Bell. After further campaigning, the CIW was able to pressure
McDonalds in 2007 to agree to its terms. Burger King, Whole Food Market and Subway fol-
lowed suit in 2008. In March 2009, the SFA launched its “Dine with Dignity” campaign to
pressure food service providers on campus to join the Fair Food Program. This ultimately led
to Bon Appe´tit, Compass Group, Aramark and Sodexo acceding to the CIW’s demands. Trader
Joe’s and Chipotle Mexican Grill signed in 2012, and Walmart and Fresh Market signed in
2014. There are still a number of businesses that operate in Florida that have not yet signed an
agreement with the CIW—Wendy’s is the last of the five major fast food corporations and the
Publix supermarket chain is one of the few remaining retailers. These corporations are cur-
rently the targets of a wide-ranging campaign and boycott.
180 Campaign for Fair Food, COAL. OF IMMOKALEE WORKERS, http://ciw-online.org/cam
paign-for-fair-food [https://perma.cc/GSQ4-M5LT] (last visited Feb. 1, 2017).
181 Sean Sellers & Greg Asbed, The History and Evolution of Forced Labor in Florida
Agriculture, 5 RACE/ETHNICITY: MULTIDISCIPL. GLOBAL CONTEXTS 29 (2011).
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cents a bucket (roughly 32 lbs. of tomatoes).182 This meant that workers were
forced to pick close to 2 tons of tomatoes (or 125 buckets) to make $50 per
day.183 Rest periods were rare or non-existent. Female workers complained
of sexual harassment and of routinely being asked to provide sex in ex-
change for ongoing work.184 Even slavery and human trafficking were not
unheard of—the Department of Justice brought seven claims of servitude
against farm labor operations in Florida between 1998 and 2013.185 As a
result, in this period, law enforcement authorities released more than 1,000
workers held as slaves by crew bosses.186
The situation on the ground has changed markedly since the implemen-
tation of the Fair Food Program. The CIW’s Code of Conduct regulates
working conditions such as wages, health and safety, workplace violence,
and anti-discrimination.187 It also contains a sophisticated dispute resolution
process that allows workers to make complaints about violations without
fear of reprisal. Further, compliance with the Code of Conduct is subject to
regular external auditing. The dispute resolution and auditing is carried out
by an organization that is independent from the industry, called the Fair Food
Standards Council (“Standards Council”). Judge Laura Safer Espinoza, a
retired judge of the New York Supreme Court, currently is the head of the
Standards Council.188
The CIW is not incorporated and has no legal personality. It does not
contain a hierarchical decision-making structure, and in fact, all workers are
encouraged to participate. The CIW has about 4,500 members although for-
mal membership confers few additional benefits.  All tomato workers in Im-
mokalee and surrounding regions are welcome to join a fluid “board” of
self-appointed members that meet on a monthly basis to determine the
CIW’s campaign directions. Many of the original founders of the group are
still active participants.
However, a formal structure is necessary for certain functions, such as
applying and holding foundation grants. For these purposes, the Standards
Council is incorporated and listed as a 501(c)(3) organization to have tax-
182 Eric Schlosser, Penny Foolish, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/11/29/opinion/29schlosser.html [https://perma.cc/VQ5D-HA2D].
183 See id.
184 See John Bowe, Nobodies, THE NEW YORKER (Apr. 21, 2003), http://www.newyork
er.com/magazine/2003/04/21/nobodies [https://perma.cc/2KB5-VCPR].
185 Sellers & Asbed, supra note 181. R
186 Id.
187 Fair Food Code of Conduct, FAIR FOOD STANDARDS COUNCIL, http://www.fairfoodstan
dards.org/resources/fair-food-code-of-conduct [https://perma.cc/EU3G-L9T3] (last visited
Feb. 2, 2017).
188 Judge Laura Safer Espinoza, FAIR FOOD STANDARDS COUNCIL, http://www.fairfood-
standards.org/about/judge-laura-safer-espinoza [https://perma.cc/EU3G-L9T3] (last visited
Feb. 1, 2017); About, FAIR FOOD STANDARDS COUNCIL, http://www.fairfoodstandards.org/
about [https://perma.cc/PKX8-BXMT] (last visited Sept. 24, 2017).
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exempt status.189 The CIW receives most of its current funding from a few
private philanthropic organizations. These amounts pay the CIW’s operating
costs and staff wages. The CIW is acutely aware that operating in this man-
ner is precarious because the loss of a single grant could cause havoc to its
operations. As a result, the CIW is currently in the process of designing a
Fair Food certification scheme that it can license to generate revenue on a
more sustainable basis.190 The Fair Food certification would entitle retailers
to mark either the tomatoes they are selling with a sticker or to have a point-
of-sale display indicating that they are participating in the Fair Food
Program.
In 2015, the CIW expanded the Fair Food Program to tomato producers
in other nearby states (Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia,
Maryland, New Jersey) and other crops (peppers and strawberries).191
1. Building an effective private regulatory system
The Fair Food Program represents a form of private regulation, shaping
the behavior of farm employers through standards developed by workers,
monitored by an independent organization, and enforced through market
sanctions. Enforcement takes place through a potent mix of proactive and
reactive enforcement mechanisms. Any detected violation must be immedi-
ately remedied, and failure to do so results in exclusion from the program for
a stipulated period of time. Such exclusion can have serious financial impact
on the grower, which must then find a non-participating buyer to take the
perishable stock off its hands. The Fair Food Program applies many of the
lessons that civil society groups have learned from successfully regulating
transnational supply chains.192 Another factor behind the Fair Food Program’s
success is that it makes powerful entities at the top of the food supply chain
responsible for working conditions of those employed throughout.
The Fair Food Program works as a successful private regulatory system
for four main reasons.193 First, the standards contained in the Code of Con-
duct have been determined in close coordination with workers, and as a re-
sult, reflect matters that are of deep interest to them.194 For example, workers
have long complained about the pervasive practice of being required to fill
their collection buckets above the brim—a practice that effectively denied
189 Donate, FAIR FOOD STANDARDS COUNCIL, http://www.fairfoodstandards.org/donate
[https://perma.cc/66M9-E9MN] (last visited Sept. 24, 2017).
190 Interview with Marley Moynahan, Communication Officer, Coalition of Immokalee
Workers (Dec. 10, 2015) [hereinafter Moynahan, Interview].
191 FAIR FOOD STANDARDS COUNCIL, FAIR FOOD PROGRAM: 2015 ANNUAL REPORT 2
(2015), http://fairfoodstandards.org/15SOTP-Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/PWH2-MXAX]
[hereinafter FAIR FOOD STANDARDS COUNCIL, 2015 REPORT] .
192 See supra note 77. R
193 See James J. Brudney, Decent Labour Standards in Corporate Supply Chains: The
Immokalee Workers Model, in TEMPORARY LABOUR MIGRATION IN THE GLOBAL ERA: THE
REGULATORY CHALLENGES 361–70 (Joanna Howe & Rosemary Owens eds., 2016).
194 Id. at 364–65.
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workers payment for up to 10% of the tomatoes they harvested.195 The Code
of Conduct requires that employers require their workers to fill the buckets
to the brim and not above.196 Second, compliance with the Fair Food Pro-
gram is subject to regular and thorough audit by an independent and credible
third party.197 The auditing process is thorough because it involves examina-
tion of complete payroll records, discussions with all levels of management,
and interviews with at least 50% of the workers employed at any particular
enterprise.198 Third, workers can also directly complain if there has been a
violation, and these claims are swiftly investigated and resolved.199 When
making these complaints, workers can take comfort in knowing that em-
ployer reprisals will be punished and that they will be reinstated if their
employment is terminated.200 Fourth, non-compliance is subject to transpar-
ent sanctions that hold serious commercial implications for wrongdoers.201
The standards contained in the Code of Conduct are comprehensive.
The initial purpose of the Code of Conduct was to require tomato purchasers
to pay 1.5 pennies more per pound of tomatoes purchased, which then would
be passed on to the workers in a verifiable way.202  The wage premium in
most cases resulted in the real wages of farm workers increasing by 20-35%,
with workers subsequently receiving an hourly wage of $8.75.203 This pre-
mium has resulted in millions of dollars of additional wage payments for
workers.204 In the ensuing years, the Code of Conduct has evolved into a
sophisticated document containing several substantive rights and entitle-
ments. The main provisions of the Code of Conduct require growers to abide
by all applicable federal, state and local laws; directly hire workers rather
than through labor contractors; provide employees with protective gear and
training for their use; create mobile shade structures; eliminate workplace
violence, forced labor, child labor, and sexual harassment; keep comprehen-
sive records; and provide paid training to workers about the terms of the
Code of Conduct and their rights.205
The Standards Council conducts external audits of growers to ensure
compliance with the terms of the Code of Conduct. When growers sign the
195 On the Elimination of the Required Overfilling of Buckets through the CIW’s Fair Food
Code of Conduct, COALITION OF IMMOKALEE WORKERS (Apr. 30, 2011), http://www.ciw-on
line.org/blog/2011/04/bucket_overfilling [https://perma.cc/P4CH-WS5Y].
196 Id.
197 Brudney, supra note 193, at 365–69.
198 Id.
199 Id. at 365.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 369.
202 Moynahan, Interview, supra note 190 (growers are entitled to retain the other 0.5 cents R
for administrative costs in administering the Fair Food Program).
203 Greenhouse, supra note 178. R
204 FAIR FOOD STANDARDS COUNCIL, FAIR FOOD PROGRAM: 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 2
(2014) http://fairfoodstandards.org/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/14SOTP-Web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S7VY-7MS7 [hereinafter FAIR FOOD STANDARDS COUNCIL, 2014 ANNUAL
REPORT].
205 Fair Food Code of Conduct, supra note 187. R
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Code of Conduct, they agree to participate in the auditing process, which
means allowing all payroll records and other company documents to be in-
spected and requiring all crew leaders, supervisors and members of manage-
ment to answer questions while being interviewed.206 The auditing process is
extensive. It can last anywhere from two days to two weeks.207 The auditors
inspect payroll and other records to ensure that the wage premium is being
passed on to workers and that workers are being provided with the minimum
wage. The Standards Council makes it a practice to interview at least 50% of
the workforce irrespective of size of the grower.208 In addition, the auditors
interview each level of management. In the 2014-2015 growing year for ex-
ample, 27 management audits, 32 payroll audits, and 36 operation audits
were carried out in Florida (3,617 workers and 102 crew leaders were inter-
viewed).209 Every grower is audited each season. The results from four sea-
sons of audits show that the situation is gradually improving on the ground
with fewer violations being found. Fine has described the monitoring pro-
cess in glowing terms, stating that, “[t]his is the best workplace-monitoring
program I’ve seen in the U.S.” 210
Once an audit detects a violation, the most common remedial action
taken is the development of a corrective action plan. The grower is also
suspended from the program until the corrective measures are implemented.
To date, 13 growers have been placed on probation and 7 growers have been
suspended from the Fair Food Program for varying lengths of time for failing
to implement a corrective action plan.211 The purposes of the corrective ac-
tion plans are to drive systemic change, set out a clear path for doing so, and
achieve buy-in from key stakeholders.
The Fair Food Program recognizes that auditing will not pick up all
violations. In these cases, a credible complaint-resolution process supports
workers exercising “voice.” The process is underpinned by three elements:
education of workers, a 24-hour bilingual complaints line operated by the
Standards Council (workers can also complain directly to the CIW or grow-
ers, although this is less common), and a process for investigating and
resolving complaints. Complaints are investigated, and where a violation is
found, resolved by discussion with the relevant crew leaders and growers to
ensure that appropriate redress is made. According to the Standards Council,
participating growers have “adopted a cooperative attitude towards jointly
resolving worker complaints.”212 In the 2014-2015 growing year, the Stan-
dards Council dealt with 261 complaints in Florida (91 complaints were
206 Id. at Part IV.
207 FAIR FOOD STANDARDS COUNCIL, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 204, at 2, 17.
208 Moynahan, Interview, supra note 190. R
209 FAIR FOOD STANDARDS COUNCIL, 2015 REPORT, supra note 191, at 44. R
210 Greenhouse, supra note 178. R
211 FAIR FOOD STANDARDS COUNCIL, 2015 REPORT, supra note 191, at 45. R
212 Id. at 14.
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made to the CIW and a further 30 complaints made directly to growers).213
This represented a significant increase from the 2011-2012 growing year,
which saw 84 complaints in total.214 The increase in complaints is likely due
to growing worker awareness about their rights under the Code of Conduct
and to mounting confidence among workers that they will not face negative
consequences for complaining.215
Credible sanctions are the final key to the success of the Fair Food
Program. Employers that violate the terms of the Code of Conduct realize
that the Standards Council or CIW will learn of this and that they will face
consequences.216 There are three categories of violations prescribed. “Article
I violations,” the so-called “zero tolerance provisions,” are the most serious
and include the use of forced labor and systemic use of child labor.217 “Arti-
cle II violations” include discrimination, sexual harassment, systematic
wage violations, and any reprisal against a worker exercising their rights
under the Code of Conduct. Article III violations are the least serious and
include non-systematic wage violations. Article I violations result in an im-
mediate suspension. Suspension periods from the Fair Food Program in-
crease in severity with each suspension—the first suspension is for 90 days,
the second is for 180 days, and the third is for one full calendar year. Article
II and III violations require the grower to develop and implement a correc-
tive action plan, and failure to abide by the terms of this plan can result in a
suspension for a period of time until compliance is achieved. The Code of
Conduct also stipulates disciplinary measures for crew leaders and other su-
pervisory staff found to be in breach of the terms of the Code of Conduct,
which range from the termination of employment to a lifetime ban on work-
ing for a participating grower. The Standards Council or the CIW may also
refer certain illegal conduct to law enforcement authorities—for example in
cases of assault, sexual harassment and slavery.218
If a grower is suspended or excluded from the Fair Food Program alto-
gether, it loses the ability to sell to those buyers that are signatories of the
program, because the buyers have agreed to purchase their tomatoes only
from certified suppliers. James Brudney argues that the potential loss of this
business constitutes an effective incentive even though tomato sales through
the Fair Food Program only constitute around 20% of growers’ total sales.219
Due to the perishable nature of tomatoes, it is extremely difficult for a sus-
pended producer to organize an alternative buyer on short notice.
213 Id. at 46.
214 Id.
215 See Brudney, supra note 193, at 364–65. R
216 A working group consisting of growers and CIW members advises the Standards
Council about how best to practically implement the various provisions of the CIW.
217 Fair Food Code of Conduct, supra note 187. R
218 Moynahan, Interview, supra note 190. R
219 Brudney, supra note 193, at 369 & n.86. R
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The real strength of the Fair Food Program is that it takes into account
the fact that working conditions in the agricultural sector are directly im-
pacted by broader transformations in the food industry.220 Farm producers
are subject to enormous pressure on account of two significant trends in the
food industry, and therefore, might not be in the best position to provide
better wages and conditions. First, the consolidation of a global food market
due to increased trade liberalization has increased the competition to which
farmers are subject.221 Second, increasing concentration amongst compa-
nies—particularly among those responsible for producing the inputs that
farmers use (such as seeds and pesticides), and buying the products that
farmers produce—has shifted the balance of power away from farmers.222
The mechanisms by which sellers and buyers exercise market power are
multifaceted and complex. Although governments have generally been alive
to the issue of monopolistic and oligopolistic sellers abusing market power
to command higher prices, the pernicious effects of concentrated buyer
power have been less well understood.223 Harvey James and colleagues argue
that farmers’ weakness vis-a`-vis buyers can be explained through factors
such as high switching costs and lack of alternative buyers.224 This means
that farmers are paying higher costs for inputs and receiving lower prices for
their produce due to structural changes in the food system. They often re-
spond by seeking to gain greater surplus value from their workers’ labor.225
The CIW understands these broader political economy dynamics, and
as a result, the Fair Food Program targets those at the top of the food supply
chain to guarantee decent working conditions of those employed by its sup-
pliers. When the CIW first targeted Yum! Foods in 2000 (which owns Taco
Bell, Pizza Hut and KFC fast food chains), the company predictably claimed
that it could not be held responsible for labor conditions in its supply chain.
The CIW, however, did not falter and waged a campaign to pressure those
entities to wield their power to improve working conditions on farms. It is
these entities that have the real power to change the situation for farm
workers.
These four aspects of the Fair Food Program—standards determined by
workers, enforcement predicated on thorough monitoring, a robust worker-
complaint mechanism, and imposing real responsibility on the lead firms
through meaningful sanctions—represent a particularly effective form of
private regulation. Some have taken to using the moniker “worker-driven
social responsibility” to distinguish this form from previous corporate-led
220 See supra discussion Part II.
221 See supra note 79. R
222 See supra note 81. R
223 Peter C. Carstensen, Buyer Power, Competition Policy, and Antitrust: The Competitive
Effects of Discrimination Among Suppliers, 52 ANTITRUST BULL. 271, 272 (2008).
224 Harvey S. James, Jr., Mary Hendrickson & Philip H. Howard, Networks, Power and
Dependency in the Agrifood Industry, in THE ETHICS AND ECONOMICS OF AGRIFOOD COMPETI-
TION (Harvey S. James, Jr. ed., 2013), at 99–126.
225 See, e.g., Preibisch, supra note 96, at 406; Preibisch, supra note 81, at 421. R
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incarnations that were characterized by “voluntary commitments, broad
standards that often merely mirror[ed] local law, ineffective or non-existent
monitoring, and the absence of any commitment to or mechanisms for the
enforcement of the meagre standards that. . .exist[ed].”226
III. WHEN CAN LABOR ORGANIZATIONS MAKE A DIFFERENCE?
The purpose of the following discussion is to analyze the work of these
organizations along two axes. The first axis of investigation is to compare
organizations performing similar types of work in order to draw conclusions
about when these legal engagements work best. The second axis of investi-
gation is to consider these legal engagements against the political economy
of the food system, the regulatory framework, and the demographics of the
migrant farm workforce, to arrive at some findings about which legal en-
gagements should be preferred. This analysis reveals that labor organizations
may be able to extend existing regulatory protections in a way that current
actors cannot and design private systems of regulation that transcend the
limitations of public ones.
The AWA and JIM engage with the law in similar ways, although they
operate under different legal and political conditions. Both organizations
build the rights consciousness of workers, seek to improve compliance with
existing laws, and achieve legal reform to broaden the suite of rights availa-
ble to migrant farm workers. In building the rights consciousness of workers
and in improving compliance with laws, these two labor organizations oper-
ate in ways that traditional regulatory agencies are unable to do.227 Matthew
Amengual and Janice Fine invoke the idea of the “non-substitutable capabil-
ities of state and society” in appealing for regulators to “co-enforce” stan-
dards with labor organizations.228 This research supports the notion that
rather than simply filling existing regulatory gaps, labor organizations are
able to operate in ways that expand existing protections for farm workers.
Migrant farm workers lack knowledge about their existing statutory
rights and the mechanisms to enforce them, and labor organizations can play
a critical role in improving workers’ rights consciousness in ways that are
cognizant of their experiences. Rather than waiting until workers have ar-
rived in the United States or Canada, the AWA and JIM work across the
entire labor migration cycle to increase knowledge of rights. The AWA
works with Mexican state institutions to distribute material to temporary mi-
grant workers before they reach Canada, and it operates ten support centers
in regional locations to conduct further outreach once workers have arrived.
226 WORKER-DRIVEN SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY NETWORK, WHAT IS WORKER-DRIVEN SO-
CIAL RESPONSIBILITY (WSR)? 1 (2017), https://www.nesri.org/programs/worker-driven-social-
responsibility-collaborative [https://perma.cc/9JW2-GBVZ] (last visited Aug. 16, 2017).
227 Although traditional labor organizations can perform a similar function, at least in
North America, this tends to not be the case.
228 Amengual and Fine, supra note 52, at 129. R
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Similarly, JIM works with its Defender network in the migrant workers’
home countries to distribute information. These Defenders act as trusted in-
termediaries, providing information in an appropriate way so that it is accu-
rately received.
Migrant farmworkers need extra support to claim their employment
rights through administrative or judicial processes, and state regulators cur-
rently do not have the resources to provide this assistance. Labor organiza-
tions such as the AWA are in a position to offer the kinds of language,
logistical and emotional supports that state agencies cannot, so that workers
can vindicate their rights. Migrant workers also lead lives in several coun-
tries, and once they enter the United States or Canada for work, several
overlapping regimes of regulation apply to them. The narrow legislative
mandates that regulatory agencies work within prevent them from crossing
policy boundaries or operating in other jurisdictions. Labor organizations are
not so encumbered—they can cross policy and national boundaries with
more agility to act in the interests of migrant workers as the AWA and JIM
cases demonstrate.
While many of the measures just described allow workers to claim
some measure of justice, it is questionable whether they make an impact on
working conditions in the sector more broadly. The strategies adopted by the
AWA and JIM require workers to come forward and pursue claims either
with enforcement agencies or through the courts. There is significant evi-
dence that low-wage workers are unwilling to complain because they fear
retaliation.229 This is especially the case for migrant farm workers, who are
“unfree” in the sense that they have various restrictions placed on their abil-
ity to sell their labor power.230 For these workers, the costs of complaining
can be very high. Migrant farm workers entering under temporary worker
programs (e.g. H-2A, SAWP and TFWP) are the archetypical unfree workers
in the contemporary economy, because they have politico-legal restrictions
that tie them to a single employer, and prevent them from working in differ-
ent sectors.231 Similarly, undocumented workers, who labor under the fear
that migration rules will be invoked at any time to remove them from the
country, also exist closer to the “unfreedom” pole.232 This unfreedom pre-
vents migrant farm workers from exercizing the few labor rights they have
229 Weil & Pyles, supra note 38, at 63–64. R
230 See, e.g., Clark, supra note 121 at 3–4; Kendra Strauss, Coerced, Forced and Unfree R
Labour: Geographies of Exploitation in Contemporary Labour Markets, 6 GEOGRAPHY COM-
PASS 137 (2012); HAHAMOVITCH, NO MAN’S LAND, supra note 85, at 2; ROBERT MILES, CAPI- R
TALISM AND UNFREE LABOUR (1987) (noting that the concept of unfreedom, located in Marxist
political economy, seeks to explain the migrant farm workers’ vulnerability through their cir-
cumscribed ability to circulate in the labour market—e.g. changing employers is extremely
difficult, and workers cannot work in another industry).
231 See e.g., Clark, supra note 121, at 10. R
232 Strauss, supra note 230, at 141 (proposing a continuum approach to the issue of labor R
unfreedom because powerful and persistent forms of unfreedom can result among workers
who are free to sell their labor due to economic compulsion and disparities in gender, citizen-
ship status, race, and ethnicity).
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because employer retaliation can have disastrous consequences. As a result,
the claims that the AWA and JIM make possible, as important as they are in
achieving justice for individual workers, are simply not enough to change
the cost-calculus for farm employers.233
The AWA and JIM also fight vigorously for more legal rights for farm
workers. The AWA has prioritized launching constitutional litigation to
achieve freedom of association rights for farm workers, while JIM mainly
lobbies governments in sending and receiving countries for new laws that
would lessen the vulnerability of workers, such as laws to punish the charg-
ing of recruitment fees.
The political process is generally receptive to those with power and
wealth, and since the migrant farm worker community is lacking in both, it
may appear that legal channels might prove to be more receptive. However,
the experience of the AWA suggests that the legal path is also fraught with
danger. The AWA/UFCW’s decade-long struggle to win collective bargain-
ing rights for farm workers only resulted in an irredeemably compromised
labor relations statute. Because the AWA/UFCW did not prioritize move-
ment building, when the court action failed, it had little to show for its ef-
forts. The AWA’s and JIM’s experiences reinforce the fact that a legal
strategy must be married with a political one to obtain the greatest benefit.
That is, when using litigation to win new rights for migrant farm workers,
the law should also be harnessed to build and coalesce movements.
Comparing the work of the CIW and JIM yields another set of insights
about the relative merits of different legal engagements because both operate
in a similar legal and political context, but take diametrically different ap-
proaches to the law. The difficulty that the CIW had gaining the attention of
government authorities to address farm workers’ conditions led to its leader-
ship losing faith in public regulatory systems. As a result, the CIW devised
its own system of private rights backed up by a sophisticated monitoring and
enforcement regime—the Fair Food Program. In contrast, JIM tries to up-
hold the few statutory rights that migrant farm workers have.
The Fair Food Program puts into practice several of the lessons that
public regulators have learned about enforcing employment standards in
low-wage industries, as well as lessons activists have learned coming out of
several decades of experience with designing private regulatory systems to
regulate global supply chains.234 The Fair Food Program contains robust stan-
dards, empowered workers, thorough auditing by an independent third party,
and all of this is backed up with credible sanctions. But the CIW’s system of
private regulation is not merely a surrogate for a public system; in many
233 See, e.g., Kevin Purse & Jillian Dorrian, Deterrence and Enforcement of Occupational
Health and Safety Law, 27 INT.’L J COMP. LAB. L. & INDUS. REL. 21, 35–36 (2011); Dorothy
Thornton et al., General Deterrence and Corporate Environmental Behavior, 27 L. & POL’Y
262, 279–81 (2005); Frank Pearce & Steve Tombs, Ideology, Hegemony, and Empiricism:
Compliance Theories of Regulation, 30 BRIT. J CRIMINOLOGY 423, 435–37 (1990).
234 See generally, LOCKE, supra note 77. R
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respects, it is better. Given that most workers in the Florida tomato industry
are undocumented, it is less likely that they would complain to a public
authority even assuming the existence of a committed and invigorated labor
inspectorate. By virtue of the Fair Food Program being a worker-driven pri-
vate system, the workers’ migration status does not become a salient issue
when lodging a complaint. The fact that the number of worker complaints
has been steadily rising during the Fair Food Program’s lifetime demon-
strates that private regulatory systems can be engineered to empower work-
ers to counterbalance their unfreedom.
Another real strength of the CIW’s Fair Food Program is that it ad-
dresses several of the major features in the political economy of contempo-
rary food production. Enforcing current existing law on the books against
farm employers does not adequately engage with powerful transformations
in the food industry that have created a competitive global market in which
farmers struggle to survive and thrive. As a result of these changes, farmers
look to offset their dwindling profit margins by demanding more flexibility
and value from their workers, thereby contributing to worsening working
conditions. Further, concentration in the food industry means that a greater
share of power and value is being retained by large corporations that provide
farm inputs and purchase the fruits and vegetables that farmers produce; in
practical effect, these entities control working conditions in the agricultural
sector. Cognizant of this political economy, the Fair Food Program attempts
to address working conditions in agriculture by making those entities at the
top of the food supply chain responsible for workers’ rights on farms.
The CIW’s strategy of targeting businesses at the apex of the food chain
would not have been possible if it were a traditional union. Labor organiza-
tions have an advantage in the agricultural sector when compared with more
traditional unions representing workers in other industries because they are
not subject to the same legal restrictions that apply to unions. For example,
unions are prohibited from carrying out secondary boycotts,235 but by virtue
of the CIW’s non-union status, no such prohibition applies to it.236  This al-
lows the CIW to focus its energy on those who wield the actual power to
affect working conditions in the agricultural sector without falling afoul of
235 See Michael C. Duff, ALT-Labor, Secondary Boycotts, and Toward a Labor Organiza-
tion Bargain, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 837, 843–45 (2014) (defining a secondary boycott or action
as when a labor union seeks help from other workers at companies doing business with their
employer).
236 See id. at 848–49 (arguing that if a statutorily-recognized traditional labor union were
to call for a boycott of entities conducting business with a farm employer in the same manner
as the CIW, this would arguably constitute a secondary boycott prohibited under § 8(b)(4)(B)
of the NLRA); see also Eli Naduris-Weissman, The Worker Center Movement and Traditional
Labor Law: A Contextual Analysis, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 232, 333–35 (2009)
(discussing the applicability of labor laws to a worker organization that is not a statutorily-
recognized union); Alan Hyde, New Institutions for Worker Representation in the United
States: Theoretical Issues, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 385, 403–410 (2006) (discussing how non-
union labor entities might be regulated by the union-centered framework of national employ-
ment law).
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these rules. However, as the power of alt-labor organizations grow, so do
calls by their conservative opponents to regulate them to minimize their radi-
cal potential. There is currently a strong push to have worker centers de-
clared unions, and regulated by the same restrictions facing trade unions.237
While the CIW’s unique model for addressing farm workers’ working
conditions has been successful, it is unclear whether it can be replicated
more widely. The fact that a significant component of the tomatoes grown in
Florida are consumed by a few fast food companies with widespread brand
recognition means that they are ripe targets for boycotts. In addition, Florida
is one of the biggest suppliers of tomatoes for the American market, particu-
larly during the winter months. Although it may be more difficult to design a
Fair Food Program for farm produce with more diffuse consumption pat-
terns, this obstacle is not insurmountable. First, a significant proportion of
farm produce is purchased and sold by supermarkets. There has been major
consolidation among food retailers—six supermarket brands dominate the
Canadian market238 and the United States market is similarly concentrated
(for example, Walmart accounts for between one quarter to one third of retail
grocery sales in the United States).239 These supermarket brands may be just
as susceptible to consumer boycotts, as evidenced by the fact that the CIW
has already pressured a number of supermarkets to sign on to the Fair Food
Program, most notably Walmart.240 Further, the Fair Food Program demon-
strates that a participating buyer need only consume a proportion of the total
before it starts to make financial sense for a grower to agree to the buyer’s
more stringent standards. However, the balance of forces between farm em-
ployers, purchasers and consumers in particular markets will have to be
carefully analyzed before other labor organizations decide to follow the path
of the CIW. What is clear is that the CIW’s model of targeting entities at the
top of the food supply chain offers a more durable solution to the general
problem of dismal working conditions than current models imposing liabil-
ity solely on farm employers.
The foregoing discussion makes clear the ongoing need for a meso-
level analysis of labor organizations, focusing on their legal engagements.
Comparing the legal strategies of various labor organizations allows us to
understand the conditions under which they can succeed.241 As the compari-
237 One organization at the forefront of this conservative backlash against the perceived
threats of alt-labor was Worker Center Watch, a “shadowy” website with ties to the CEO of
Walmart. See Lee Fang, Former Wal-Mart Exec Leads Shadowy Smear Campaign Against
Black Friday, THE NATION (Nov. 26, 2013), https://www.thenation.com/article/former-
walmart-exec-leads-shadowy-smear-campaign-against-black-friday-activists [https://perma.cc/
LRG5-DQ73].
238 In Canada, the top six retailers control 80% of retail food. Preibisch, supra note 81, at R
427.
239 James et al., supra note 224. R
240 For example, Walmart, Fresh Market, Trader Joe’s, and Whole Food Markets are all
members of the Fair Food Program. See Greenhouse, supra note 178. R
241 S. KARTHICK RAMAKRISHNAN AND IRENE BLOEMRAAD, CIVIL HOPES AND POLITICAL
REALITIES, 31–33 (2008).
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son between the AWA and JIM indicates, analyzing similar legal engage-
ments of different labor organizations reveal important insights even when
these organizations operate in different legal and political contexts. A com-
parative case study method centered on their strategies also tells us about the
respective utility of specific legal engagements given similar political eco-
nomic considerations.
CONCLUSION
The response of labor organizations to working conditions in the agri-
cultural sector presents a useful way to approach the broader question of
labor movement revitalization. Migrant farm workers, and the organizations
that look after their interests, represent some of the most creative and ener-
getic elements of the broader labor movement. But what can the rest of the
labor movement learn from these actors?
First, labor organizations must understand and respond to the political
economy in determining a course of action. This includes engaging seriously
with the question of production arrangements. The CIW, for example, has
devised a private regulatory system that is based on a sound analysis of how
tomatoes are grown and consumed in Florida. It has compelled those entities
with the most power to affect working conditions to take responsibility. En-
gaging with the political economy also means identifying and addressing the
conditions that give rise to the situation in which workers find themselves. In
the case of migrant farm workers, claiming individual employment rights
can be difficult because employment and immigration regimes interact to
create forms of unfreedom. The AWA and JIM take a two-pronged approach
to this problem. While facilitating more individual claims, the AWA and JIM
are also involved in political advocacy to change the deeper structures that
impede claim-making, such as immigration rules.
Second, labor organizations must use a range of strategies, drawing on
law, but also transcending it. Labor organizations that represent farm work-
ers often operate at the interstices of the law because these workers lack
effective labor regulation. As a result, while labor organizations maneuver to
make existing laws more effective, they also treat law as a cultural and polit-
ical resource. In certain circumstances, they have even developed their own
regulatory systems that mimic state law regimes. As conventional labor laws
lose their ability to influence working conditions for a growing segment of
the workforce, the legal engagements of labor organizations may point the
way for a labor movement struggling to find its way in a hostile legal
environment.
Third, to achieve sustainable change, labor organizations must ulti-
mately build popular movements consisting of workers and allies. Popular
mobilizations are necessary to pressure governments to properly enforce
their existing rules or to create new laws. Popular movements are also a
necessary feature of private regulatory systems because they are required to
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implement sanctions that encourage business compliance. Building powerful
movements of workers will necessitate patient and thoughtful work and re-
quire asking questions such as: where does power reside? Who should be
targeted? Who should be sought out as allies? What tactics (e.g. strikes, boy-
cotts, marches, rallies etc.) should be employed? Labor organizations, such
as the CIW, show the potential of organizations embedded in bigger social
movements to achieve transformative and durable change.
As many commentators on the alt-labor movement have recognized, the
Achilles heel of labor organizations remains their funding situation.242 Labor
organizations are funded for the most part through private foundation funds,
leaving them susceptible to the influence of private donors as well as vulner-
able to shifting priorities. In the case of the AWA, it is entirely funded by the
UFCW. Unlike trade unions, which are funded through membership dues,
labor organizations lack sustainable funding models. As one prominent
union organizer, Karen Nussbaum, astutely points out, “worker organiza-
tions that aren’t self-sustaining can’t be democratic.”243 Obtaining ongoing
and sustainable sources of funding will be critical to their ultimate success.
Terrible working conditions have been a persistent feature of non-sub-
sistence agriculture in North America, but recent economic restructuring has
only made these conditions more pronounced. The agricultural sector may
be a harbinger of working conditions under advanced capitalism caused by
shifts in production and business organization, regulatory degradation, and a
large migrant workforce. We should come to see labor organizations actively
trying to achieve justice on our fields as pointing the way for a rejuvenated
labor movement.
242 See, e.g., Jonathan Timms, A Labor Movement That’s More About Women, THE ATLAN-
TIC (Aug. 25, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/08/the-womens-labor-
movement/497294 [http://perma.cc/L4LV-9HEQ]; Josh Eidelson, Who Should Fund Alt-La-
bor?, THE NATION (Jul. 17, 2013), https://www.thenation.com/article/who-should-fund-alt-la
bor [http://perma.cc/3CPR-AKE6].
243 See Eidelson, supra note 242. R
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